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MANDATORY ARBITRATION: PRIVATIZING
PUBLIC RIGHTS, COMPELLING THE UNWILLING
TO ARBITRATE
Clyde W. Summerst
In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has reinterpreted the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 19251 after suddenly discovering that the
statute did more than place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing
as other contracts .... The statute, said the Court in 1983, in words since
tirelessly repeated, established a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements 3 that impelled lower courts to generously interpret arbitration
agreements, liberally construe statutes to allow arbitration of rights created
by those statutes, and deferentially review arbitration awards under a
"manifest disregard ' 4 standard. As a result, contractual provisions
requiring arbitration of all future disputes, including statutory claims, have
proliferated. These provisions have become commonplace in standard-
form adhesion contracts governing employment, consumer credit,
installment sales, service, finance, banking, medical care, and many other
5areas.
The effect of these contracts has been to privatize justice, substituting
privately constructed arbitration for publicly established courts. This
becomes particularly problematic when the rights being adjudicated are not
contractual rights created by the parties, but statutory rights created by
t Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. The author is deeply indebted to Kimberly Kabnick, J.D. 2004, for her exhaustive
research and organization of the cases and materials for this article, and to William Draper
for his library assistance. The fact that I may not have made the best use of their help is
solely my responsibility.
1. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(2000)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) ("An arbitration agreement is placed upon the
same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.").
3. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
4. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
5. Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 831, 834 & n.29 (2002); see also id. at 844-50 (finding that the use of these
contractual provisions seems to be a uniquely American practice; the European Union
clearly prohibits such provisions in consumer contracts and probably prohibits them in
employment contracts).
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Congress, or legal rights established by common law. I want to outline
some of the consequences of this privatizing of public rights, to inquire
why it has occurred, and to suggest what might be done about it. My focus
is on the use of arbitration provisions in individual employment contracts,
but many of the same problems and considerations apply to arbitration
provisions in other standard-form adhesion contracts.
I start with the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,6 for it is both a seminal decision and a
paradigm of the problem. Robert Gilmer was hired by Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corporation in 1981. As a condition of his employment, he was
required to register as a securities representative with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). His application to register included a provision that he
"agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy ''7 that may arise
between him and Interstate. Six years later, when he was terminated at the
age of sixty-two, he sued in federal court, claiming that his termination
violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).s
Interstate filed a motion to compel him to arbitrate his statutory age
discrimination claim in the private arbitration process established by the
exchange under the FAA.9 Mr. Gilmer argued that he could not be required
to arbitrate his ADEA claim, "rais[ing] a host of challenges to the adequacy
of arbitration procedures"' to enforce his statutory rights and to "further
important social policies"'" of the ADEA. The Supreme Court, in words
that have become the mantra in subsequent cases, rejected all of his
arguments: "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' 2 Furthermore, "so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function."' 3
The Gilmer arbitration clause had three basic characteristics that are
common to all employment contracts which seek to substitute private
arbitration processes for public judicial processes. First, the arbitration
6. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The volume of scholarly output on the topic of mandatory
arbitration in the wake of the Gilmer decision has been titanic. See, e.g., Symposium,
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2003).
7. Id. at 23 (alteration in original).
8. Id. at 23-24; Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1968) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (2000)).
9. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
10. Id. at 30.
11. Id. at27.
12. Id. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
13. Id. at 28 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
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provisions were not negotiated by the parties; they were constructed by the
employer, or its lawyers, with an eye toward protecting and furthering the
interests of the employer 4 and were presented in a standard-form contract
which the employee had to accept without change if he wanted to work.
Second, the employee is frequently not made aware of an arbitration
provision buried in the fine print or in an employee handbook.15 In Gilmer,
the provision was not even in the employment contract, but in the
exchange's registration application that the employee was required to sign
before being hired. Even when the provision is visible, the employee may
not understand its impact or the rights that he is waiving. Third, the
employee has no practical choice but to agree to the employer's prescribed
terms if he wants to obtain or retain the job. 16  The choice is between
agreeing and being unemployed, for other potential employers may have
equivalent contract clauses. In Gilmer, refusal to sign would have
effectively barred Mr. Gilmer from working in the securities industry. The
increasing commonness of these provisions in other industries significantly
affects job opportunities. These employer-designed arbitration structures
14. See Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators' Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory
Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 5 n.ll
(2003) (citing applicable NYSE rules); CONSTITUTION AND ARBITRATION RULES art. XI R.
601 (f) ("The dispute, claim or controversy shall be submitted to a single public arbitrator...
selected by the Director of Arbitration."), R. 607(a)(1) ("In all arbitration matters ... the
Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitration panel ....") (Dep't of Arbitration, N.Y.
Stock Exch. 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Rules.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
15. Plaintiffs frequently protest that they were not aware of the arbitration agreement.
See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 733, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (concerning a
plaintiff who did not remember receiving or seeing the arbitration program brochure that
had been stuffed into the employees' payroll envelopes); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc.,
113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (regarding employee handbook that had arbitration clause
on the last page). In Patterson, page three of the employee handbook stated "[This
handbook] is not intended to constitute a legal contract with any employee ...." Id at 834
(alteration in original). On page thirty-one, the acknowledgment form stated "no written
statement or agreement in this handbook concerning employment is binding .... Id But
this form also stated, "I also understand that as a condition of employment ... [I] agree to
abide by and accept the final decision of the arbitration panel as ultimate resolution of my
complaint(s) for any and all events that arise out of employment ...." Id. at 834-35. In
both cases, the court held that the employee was bound.
16. The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion since reversed, held that discharge of an employee
for refusal to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement is not a violation of Title VII. EEOC
v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 345 F.3d
742, 748 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that "[a]ll of the other circuits have
concluded that Title VII does not bar compulsory arbitration agreements."); see also Weeks
v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (1lth Cir. 2002) (finding that a plaintiffs
refusal to sign employer's arbitration agreement was not a statutorily protected activity
under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA). Cf EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
297-98 (2002) (holding that the employee's signing does not foreclose the EEOC from
pursuing relief such as reinstatement, backpay, and damages).
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are properly described by the Court as "mandatory arbitration."17 They are
more descriptively characterized as "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts.18
I emphasize that my concern here is with employment agreements to
arbitrate disputes before a dispute arises, not with agreements to arbitrate
after a dispute arises, particularly with predispute agreements which are
contracts of adhesion. Postdispute arbitration agreements raise few of the
problems discussed here for they are not contracts of adhesion, but are
simply a means for settling an existing dispute. The Supreme Court has
casually equated predispute agreements with the settlement of commercial
disputes,' 9 but settlement agreements are bargained-for contracts, not
contracts of adhesion, because the moving party has the bargaining
leverage of a legal claim. He can refuse to settle and then litigate his
claimed right in court.
I. JUST ANOTHER FORUM?
The Court's rationale in Gilmer was that arbitration is just another
forum, one in which the party does not forgo substantive rights afforded by
the statute. The quite visible premise was that the choice of forum has no
impact on substantive rights, a proposition that every legislator, judge, and
lawyer knows is palpably false.20 Legislators, in designing regulation,
deliberately designate the enforcement forum: in federal or state courts, in
an administrative agency, or in a named government office. Judges
develop additional rules concerning the appropriate forum and venue.
Lawyers commonly engage in forum shopping to select the forum which
they consider most favorable. 2' The Court's premise that the choice of
forum has no impact on substantive rights is clearly nonsense as a general
17. The Supreme Court first used the term "mandatory arbitration" in a majority
opinion in 2002. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283; see also Alleyne, supra note 14, at 16-17
n.70 (referring to Waffle House as the first case in which a Supreme Court majority used the
term "mandatory arbitration").
18. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Alleyne,
supra note 14, at 50.
19. The language in the Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. opinion about the
indistinguishability between an arbitral forum and a court, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991), was
quoted from a case that addressed an agreement to settle commercial disputes by arbitration.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 617 (1985).
20. Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("[P]arty... only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.") with U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S.
351, 359-60 (1971) ("This Court has always recognized that the choice of forums inevitably
affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated before the chosen forum. In
particular, where arbitration is concerned, the Court has been acutely sensitive to these
differences.").
21. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (allowing for creative
use of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer provisions to escape state-law time bar).
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proposition. The more pointed question is whether it is true in those cases
where employees are seeking to enforce their statutory rights and where the
alternative fora are either arbitration or the courts.
I want to explore some of the differences between these two fora and
their procedures to determine the effect of those differences on practical
consequences. The focus here will be on the individual employee's ability
to enforce his statutory rights and to further the policies of the statute. I
will concentrate on seven differences, some that are inherent in the
procedures and others that are commonly imposed by the employer's
construction of the process.
A. Judge and Arbitrator
In principle, both judges and arbitrators are neutral, but as every
lawyer knows, some are more neutral than others. Judges and arbitrators
have idiosyncratic predispositions in how they weigh the facts and interpret
the law, and these predispositions may, in varying degrees, consciously or
subconsciously, affect their judgments. The outcome of a case may depend
on who is chosen to sit in the judgment seat. In the federal courts, the
judge for a case is chosen from panels by the neutral mechanics of case
assignments, with no consideration of their predisposition or competence
22for the issues in the particular case. In arbitration, arbitrators are
commonly chosen by the parties from a panel provided by an arbitration
agency like the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the National
23Arbitration Forum (NAF). They are chosen by the parties with
consideration of their competence and assumed predisposition, with the
parties seeking opposite predispositions. The employer seeks an arbitrator
who will tend to see the case from the employer's viewpoint; the employee
seeks an arbitrator who will tend to see the case from the employee's
viewpoint. If the parties are equally informed about the arbitrators, those
with known predispositions will be rejected by one of the parties with the
likely result that an arbitrator who is relatively neutral will be selected.
But in most individual arbitration cases, the parties will not be equally
22. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2000) ("Division of business among district judges"); see, e.g.,
LOCAL R. S.D. & E.D.N.Y. R. 1 (applying to S.D.N.Y. only), R. 50.2(b) (applying to
E.D.N.Y. only) (2003), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004). See generally Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of "The Four": Judicial
Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 Miss. L. J. 369, 372 (1998) ("The relevant federal
statutes do not require any particular method of judicial assignment to cases.").
23. NAT'L RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DisPuTEs R. 12(b) (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n 2004) [hereinafter AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES], available at
http://www.adr.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2004); CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 21(B) (Nat'l
Arbitration Forum 2003) [hereinafter NAF CODE], available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/code/070103.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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informed. The employer and its law firm are repeat players,24 and through
their various associations may know an arbitrator's record and indications
of his predispositions. The individual, a one-time player, knows nothing
about an arbitrator except what is revealed on his resume, which will
studiously accent his neutrality. The employee's lawyer may be equally
uninformed. In larger cities, there might be an organization for employee-
plaintiff's lawyers such as the National Employment Lawyers
Association; 25 if an individual finds her way into their hands, she may be
on a more equal footing. The parties will then be more likely to agree on
an arbitrator who is relatively neutral, knowledgeable, and experienced in
the legal issues.
There is an additional advantage for the repeat player. Arbitrators
know that employers are repeat players and will be familiar with competing
arbitrators' records. To continue their acceptability, arbitrators may,
consciously or subconsciously, tend to avoid a record which employers will
view as unfavorable.26
The potential for submerged bias, however, may precede the parties
choosing an arbitrator from a panel; the potential bias may be built into the
naming of the panel from which the arbitrators are chosen. In Hooters of
America, Inc. v. Phillips,27 the employer compiled the list of approved
arbitrators from which complaining employees were required to choose; "a
mechanism," observed the Fourth Circuit, "crafted to ensure a biased
decisionmaker. ' '28 The court pointed out that "Hooters is free to devise lists
of partial arbitrators" and "nothing in the rules restricts Hooters from
punishing arbitrators who rule against the company by removing them from
the list.
29
24. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 191 (1997) (making an empirical study of the repeat-
player effect). At least one court has recognized this effect. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
25. Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A
Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremaiad on the "Costs of Arbitration," DisP. RESOL. J., Nov.
2002-Jan. 2003, at 8, 13 ("The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), a
plaintiffs' counsel group with chapters in all major legal centers, maintains a database of
arbitrators.").
26. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759, 783 (2001); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J.
1, 43 (1996). But cf. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485 (explaining that "there are several protections
against the possibility of arbitrators systematically favoring employers because employers
are the source of future business.").
27. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999)
28. Id. at 938; see also McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding bias inherent in employer's procedure that "uses the same panel of five to seven
arbitrators in each arbitration hearing in which it participates in the state of Michigan.").
29. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 939.
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In Gilmer, employer control was only one step removed from Hooters'
direct employer control; the panel was selected by officers of the stock
exchange who had been elected by the employers. 30 However, the Court
"decline[d] to indulge the presumption that the parties ... will be unable or
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators."'"
The Court was apparently not informed that the pool of arbitrators was
97% white and 89% male, but that 92% of sexual-harassment plaintiffs are
women, and 84% of racial discrimination plaintiffs are African-American.
32
Arbitration through private agencies, such as the AAA, NAF, and
Employer Dispute Services (EDSI), does not eliminate, but rather obscures
the potential for systemic bias.33 These arbitration agencies compete to sell
their services to employers; and in mandatory arbitration, it is the employer
who unilaterally chooses the agency. The agencies have a financial and
institutional interest in offering arbitrators that are acceptable to employers;
the agency which is considered to have the most favorable list of arbitrators
will have a competitive advantage.
In Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.,34 the employer chose
EDSI to administer its arbitration process and the parties alternately struck
names from the list submitted by EDSI until only one remained.3 5 The
Sixth Circuit recognized that, because EDSI had a financial interest in
maintaining its arbitration contracts with employers, "the potential for bias
30. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 5 n. 11. In Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d
197 (2d Cir. 1998), the court recognized that the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) has been singled out for criticism because of the role that the NASD plays in
determining the pool of arbitrators who hear claims against member firms. Id. at 202. The
pool is selected by the National Arbitration Committee appointed by the Board of
Governors, and the panels are named by the Director of Arbitration also appointed by the
Board of Governors. The Director may allow the Executive Committee to appoint a panel
directly. Id. at 202-03. The plaintiff challenged the fairness of this procedure but the court
found it unnecessary to reach this issue. Id. at 203; see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 212 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding that the
NYSE's forum is "inadequate to vindicate Rosenberg's ADEA and Title VII rights"), rev'd,
170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (criticizing the district court's determination, instead finding
that the evidence "establishes no basis to invalidate the NYSE arbitral scheme.").
31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)).
32. See Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining the Procedural
Fairness ofArbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1572, 1590-91 (2000).
33. See Cliff Palefsky, NELA Executive Board Denounces AAA 's Stance on Mandatory
Arbitration, THE EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE, Winter 2000-2001, at 68 (criticizing the AAA's
stance on the issue of mandatory arbitration, especially with respect to the AAA's filing of
an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of an employer); see also id. at 70
(reprinting the resolution, to the same effect, passed by the Executive Board of the National
Employment Lawyers Association in September 2000).
34. 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
35. See id. at 314 n.7.
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exists. ' 36 The Sixth Circuit stated, "[i]n light of EDSI's role in determining
the pool of potential arbitrators, any such bias would render the arbitral
forum fundamentally unfair.
3 7
In Murray v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 400,3" the
arbitration agreement provided that an arbitrator should be chosen from "a
list of arbitrators provided by the [Local 400] President's office. '3 9 The
Fourth Circuit refused "to enforce an agreement so 'utterly lacking in the
rudiments of even-handedness. ' '4° Even though the employer-union had
no list of its own- instead obtaining its list from the AAA- the
agreement, as written, was held unenforceable.
Courts repeatedly declare that arbitrators should be impartial, but they
place the burden on the employee to prove actual partiality. 41 This
contrasts with the strict standard applied to federal judges that requires
them to avoid even the appearance of partiality.42 Claims of potential bias
of arbitrators are often summarily brushed aside, as in Gilmer.43 Courts
have not confronted the problems inherent in choosing an arbitrator, such
as the repeat-player issue and the potential bias arising from the arbitrator's
interest in future selections. Except for the Floss case, courts have not
recognized the potential for bias when the employer unilaterally chooses
the agency that provides the panel from which the employee must choose.44
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id.
38. 289 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2002).
39. Id. at 300 (alteration in original).
40. Id. at 303 (quoting Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir.
1999)).
41. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 4,
14 (1st Cir. 1999) (reversing the district court's finding of "structural bias," instead holding
that there was "no showing of actual bias" and emphasizing that the district court "explicitly
found that there was no conclusive evidence of bias").
42. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2A (Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts 2000) (requiring that federal judges "act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2004); see, e.g., United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 111-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that trial judge's
public comments created an appearance of partiality); Alleyne, supra note 14, at 36 nn.166-
73.
43. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (rejecting the
presumption of bias on the part of arbitration panels). Professor Alleyne has argued that if
the arbitrator's fee is paid by the employer, this creates an appearance of bias. Alleyne,
supra note 14, at 37-40. But cf. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (citing three factors that operate to prevent "arbitrators systematically favoring
employers"). The appearance of bias disappears, however, if the employer is legally
required to pay the arbitrator. In any case, the appearance of bias pales beside the
employer's establishment of the rules of the arbitration process and the choice of the agency
that supplies the panels from which the arbitrator is picked.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37; Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-
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B. Jury Trial and Arbitrations
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)4 5 originally did
not provide a right to a jury trial in discrimination cases. When it was
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,46 the right to jury trial was
explicitly guaranteed. The ADEA also expressly provides for a jury trial .
Additionally, employee suits in state court for wrongful discharge,
intentional causing of emotional distress, and defamation all are tried by
jury.48 Compelling arbitration deprives the employees of their rights to a
jury trial. Congress consciously decided that the availability of a jury trial
made a significant difference, and that the objectives of Title VII would be
better served if determination of the facts and damages were made by a
jury.49 Professor Sternlight has made a persuasive case that, apart from the
explicit provisions of these statutes, the Seventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in these cases.50
There is a common assumption by both employer and employee
lawyers that juries are more favorable to employees than are arbitrators and
award larger compensatory and punitive damages.5 Statistical studies have
both confirmed this assumption and questioned it. The studies are
But by How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 589,
609-11 (2001).
45. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2000)); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1117-18 (3d ed. 2002) (outlining broad landscape of jury trials under Title VII).
46. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1070, 1073 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(c) (2000)).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (2000). This provision was added by the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 189, 190
(1978).
48. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-24.1(b) (2003) (guaranteeing a jury trial, upon
request of either party, in suits under Rhode Island's fair employment practices provisions);
Gregory Gelfand, Smith v. University of Detroit: Is There a Viable Alternative to Beacon
Theatres?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 168-72 (1988) (cataloging state laws on jury trial).
49. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. H9505-01 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
William D. Ford), 1991 WL 229644 (Cong Rec) *84-85 (citing several cases that were
intended to be overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
50. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 731-32
(2001) [hereinafter Sternlight, Seventh Amendment].
51. See, e.g., David H. Gibbs, Employment Survey Says that Major Companies
Increasingly Use Tailored Programs and Processes, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF
LITIGATION, Nov. 2001, at 237 (reporting that "one out of every eight plaintiffs' verdicts in
federal courts in employment discrimination cases is for more than $1,000,000."); Lewis L.
Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 317 n.11 (2003) [hereinafter
Maltby, Frying Pan] (discussing employer fear of punitive damage judgments).
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unreliable because they mix grievance arbitration and employment
arbitration, two quite different processes5 2  Nor are they limited to
mandatory arbitration of statutory rights. Reliable statistics for comparing
jury and arbitration outcomes in statutory cases are simply not available
because arbitration proceedings are confidential and, in employment
arbitration, there is almost never a published opinion. The most telling test
is the view of the parties involved: employers impose arbitration mainly
because they believe it will result in fewer and smaller awards;53 employees
resist mandatory arbitration for the same reason. Both agree with Congress
that the choice of forum makes a difference and that the arbitral forum
produces outcomes less favorable to the employee.54
Although there is a constitutional right to jury trial, that right can be
waived, but it must be a "knowing and voluntary waiver." 55 The arbitration
52. See, e.g., Arbitration vs. Lawsuits: What Courts, Case Outcomes and Public
Perception Show About How Contractual Arbitration Compares to the Litigation System,
FORUM WHITEPAPER SERIES (Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 2003, at
2-4 & 9 n. 1I [hereinafter Arbitration Whitepaper] (concluding that employees who pursue
their claims in arbitration fare better in terms of monetary recovery and time elapsed than
workers who seek enforcement in federal court), available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/articles/whitepapers/fr903.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2004) (citing Michael
Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, CONFLICT MGMT. (Am.
Bar Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.), Winter 2003, at 1, available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/articles/pdfs/Kleiner-Delikat%20study.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2004)); Donald
Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, 5
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 61, 81 (2003) (finding awards by arbitrators and juries are similar).
All of these studies are less than convincing because the data used is not comparable: (1)
outcomes in grievance arbitration are not a reliable proxy for outcomes in individual
employment arbitration; and (2) outcomes of jury verdicts are not a reliable proxy for total
outcomes as settlements are omitted. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, FAIR PLAY:
PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 27 (2003) [hereinafter AAA FAIR PLAY] ("[T]he existing data
appear to show nothing conclusive with regard to outcome comparisons."), available at
http://www.adr.org/upload/livesite/Resources/EduResources/Arbitration%201ssues%20 1-
03.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
53. The employers' main concern is the fear that runaway juries will award
devastatingly large damages to employee-plaintiffs. See Maltby, Frying Pan, supra note 51,
at 317 n.11.
54. Cf. Overview of Contractual Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S.
Senate, 106th Cong. (2000).
55. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing
cases from Second and Sixth Circuits for proposition that "[tihe seventh amendment
right.., can be knowingly and intentionally waived by contract."); Westside-Marrero Jeep
Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D. La. 1999) ("The Supreme
Court ... has long recognized that a private litigant may waive its right to a jury in civil
cases."); see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 13,
17-18 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing various standards of knowing and voluntary); Grodin,
supra note 26, at 36-39. See generally Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving Knowing
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provision is frequently embedded in a job application or an employee
handbook that employees, though instructed to read, often do not read.56
Even if employees do read the provision, most will not realize they are
waiving their right to a jury trial. Seldom is there anything in the
agreement warning the employee that she is making such a waiver. Even if
specifically warned, she may still be unaware of the practical consequences
of such a waiver. Also, there is a substantial question as to whether there
can be a "knowing" waiver in an employment contract before there is even
a dispute and without any knowledge of the facts or legal issues that may
be involved. As a district court said in Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses,
Inc. 5 "[t]his court is hard-pressed to believe that the average job applicant
at Ryan's competing for a job washing dishes or waiting tables could
possibly pick-up on the intricacies of the Agreement and understand the
contractual scenario involved .... ,
It is even more difficult to accept that a waiver should be considered
voluntary when the employee must assent in order to obtain a job or to
retain her existing job. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC) has adopted a presumption that there cannot be a voluntary waiver
when an employee is required to sign as a condition of employment.59
Requiring a person already employed to sign raises an additional
consideration. Dismissal, a near-certain consequence of the refusal to sign,
would be a black mark on the worker's record when applying for another
job. Logically, it would seem the discharge of an employee for refusal to
sign away statutory or constitutional rights would be contrary to public
60policy, making the discharge wrongful in most states.
Professor Sternlight has extensively demonstrated that, outside the
arbitration context, courts show a readiness to invalidate waivers of jury
and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the
Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203 (2002); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 110-22.
56. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.
1994) (mentioning that the employee signed the standard U-4 forms of the NASD without
an opportunity to read them; no mention was made of arbitration and no copy of the NASD
manual was ever provided; and the court held there had not been a knowing waiver).
57. 95 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
58. Id. at 954 (footnote omitted).
59. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
133 at E-4 (July 11, 1997) (§ V(B)), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
60. A public-policy exception to at-will employment has been found when an employer
fires an employee for complying with a summons to jury duty. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d
512, 516 (Or. 1975) (finding "substantial 'societal interests' in having citizens serve on
juries."); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
("[T]he necessity of having citizens freely available for jury service is ... [a] 'recognized
facet of public policy"'); Alleyne, supra note 14, at 50 n.233.
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trial, taking into account whether it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, the conspicuousness of the waiver, the disparity of bargaining power,
61and the sophistication of the person signing the waiver. Courts which
have ruled on the issue of the burden of proof have placed it on the party
seeking to enforce the waiver, reasoning that the right to jury trial is
"fundamental," and should not be waived absent clear evidence.62 Because
the right is fundamental, the courts indulge every presumption against
waivers.
But when mandatory arbitration has the effect of waiving the right to a
jury trial, the courts' approach is entirely different. The fact that the
arbitration clause in question was not negotiated;63 that it was not
conspicuous, not read, not even available;64 and that there was a gross
disparity in the bargaining power or sophistication of the parties 65 will not
prevent the arbitration clause from waiving the statutory or constitutional
right to jury trial. The arbitration clause will be interpreted broadly and the
employee claiming the right to jury trial has the burden of showing that
Congress intended to preclude waivers of jury trials or that the contract was
66unconscionable. Instead of a presumption against the waiver of statutory
or constitutional rights, there is a presumption in favor of arbitration which
works as a waiver of the statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial.67
Such aggressive reading of the FAA does more than place arbitration
contracts on an equal footing with other contracts,68 it places arbitration
contracts on a footing above other contracts, indeed above statutorily and
constitutionally declared rights.
C. Court Filing Fees vs. Arbitration Tribunal Costs
In federal district courts, the fee for filing is a minimal $150.69 The
filing fee of the AAA for arbitration of grievance arbitration and individual
employment cases is $125,7 o and for employer-promulgated plans in
individual employment contracts, the employee's filing fee is capped at
$125, but the employee must pay the remainder, including a case service
61. See Sternlight, Seventh Amendment, supra note 50, at 674, 677-89.
62. Id. at 674, 677.
63. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 13-16 (Part II(A)).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 56.
65. See Sternlight, Seventh Amendment, supra note 50, at 704-05.
66. See id. at 673, 695-96.
67. See id. at 674, 695-710.
68. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2000).
70. AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at heading "Administrative Fee
Schedule" and subheading "Filing Fees" following R. 42 (specifying fees for employer-
promulgated plans). The filing fee was set at $125 in 2002. AAA Reduces Arbitration Costs
to Be Paid by Employers, DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 5.
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fee scaled by the amount in controversy. The AAA's scale of fees is
indicated by the following table; the fees of other agencies are roughly
comparable.7'
Table 1. AAA Fees for Employer-Promulgated Plans
Amount in Initial Case Total
Dispute Filing Fee Service Fee
Upto $10,000 $500 $200 $700
<$75,000 $750 $300 $1050
<$150,000 $1500 $750 $2250
<$300,000 $2750 $1250 $4000
<$500,000 $4250 $1750 $6000
Most discrimination cases include compensatory and punitive
damages which may range from $50,000 to $300,000;72 thus, the total
claim, including front pay and backpay, will frequently range from $75,000
to $400,000.73 As can be seen from Table 1, this indicates that total fees
will typically be between $2,250 and $4,000. Arbitration agreements
commonly call for equal division of forum fees,74 so an employee must pay
a substantial charge just for admission to the hearing room. This however,
is but the beginning; the arbitrators must also be paid.
A plaintiff-employee who brings suit in court to vindicate her
statutory rights does not, of course, have to pay the judge for services: the
provision of justice is a public responsibility. But arbitration agreements
normally provide that the employee will be required to pay half of the
arbitrator's fees. 75 Arbitrators generally charge lawyers' rates ranging from
$200-$600 per hour for all time spent in prehearing conferences, during the
71. AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at heading "Administrative Fee
Schedule" and subheading "Fees" following R. 42; see also NAF CODE, supra note 23, app.
C, at 37-46 (specifying the fee schedule for the National Arbitration Forum).
72. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1070, 1073
(1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2000)); see also Gibbs, supra note 51, at 237
(reporting that about twenty percent of jury verdicts for plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases include punitive damages).
73. Typical front pay and backpay awards range from $25,000 to $100,000. See, e.g.,
John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of
Equality, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 2583, 2587 n.18 (1994) ("The average monetary judgment per
plaintiff was $135,574 in pure ADEA cases .. "); Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC:
Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 21
(1996) (finding an "average recovery for age discrimination cases of $24,826").
74. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 28-35 (Part IV).
75. See, e.g., Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating
that the arbitration agreement in question "required [the employee] to pay one-half of the
arbitrator's fees."); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th
Cir. 1999) (noting that employee "had to pay for one-half of the arbitrator's fees.").
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hearing, for study, and for the writing of the award. Cases commonly
76consume fifteen to forty hours of billable time. In ordinary cases, the
arbitrator's fees range from $3,000 to $25,000 and in difficult cases they
can be multiples of this.77
Congress has vested workers with various civil rights that can be
adjudicated by the payment of $150; employers have imposed on workers a
substitute forum in which they can get their rights adjudicated only by the
payment of thousand of dollars. Some courts, led by Judge Edwards in
Cole, have held that the arbitration agreement cannot require fee-splitting.78
Judge Edwards caustically observed: "[i]ndeed, we are unaware of any
situation in American jurisprudence in which a beneficiary of a federal
statute has been required to pay for the services of the judge assigned to
hear her or his case."7 9 But other federal courts, following the Supreme
Court's opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,80
have held that such fee splitting is valid "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum .... ,8 The employee must pay the tribunal fees and
expenses unless she can prove that she is not financially able to pay. 82 In
short, an employee must prove poverty to avoid the increased costs of
vindicating her statutory rights in the employer-imposed arbitration forum.
D. Attorney's Fees
Mandatory arbitration clauses commonly provide that the arbitration
shall be under the rules of an arbitration agency like the AAA and those
rules provide that unless the parties agree otherwise, each party shall pay its
813own lawyer and litigation expenses. Such costs are always substantial,
76. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
77. Id. (noting that in an "average" arbitration case, costs may range from $3,750 to
$14,000, but observes that "fees of $500 or $600 per hour are not uncommon.").
78. Id. at 1484 ("[I]t is unacceptable to require [employee] to pay arbitrators' fees,
because such fees are unlike anything that he would have to pay to pursue his statutory
claims in court."); see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.)
(finding that an arbitration agreement containing a cost-splitting provision was
unconscionable), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002).
79. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
80. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
81. Id. at 90 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991));
see also Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that while
fee-splitting arrangements are not per se invalid, affirmed district court finding that this
particular provision effectively prohibited plaintiffs opportunity to vindicate her statutory
rights); accord Arakawa v. Japan Network Group, 56 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(rejecting the argument that a fee-splitting provision was invalid without evidence regarding
the plaintiff s ability to pay).
82. See Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90-91; Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 213-14, 217.
83. See, e.g., McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir.), reh'g
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and in some cases, such as FLSA cases, may far exceed the plaintiffs
damages. 84  Both Title VII85 and the ADA86 provide that a prevailing
plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees and costs, and the courts, as a
matter of course, award such fees and costs." The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA), ss the ADEA, s9 and the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)9° require that the prevailing plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees
and costs. The purpose of these provisions is two-fold: (1) to make an
employee more able to obtain a lawyer to realize her rights in small and
uncertain claims; and (2) to further the plaintiff's function as a private
attorney general serving the public interest in enforcing the statute. In the
words of the Supreme Court, "the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of
Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority."' 9' If the prevailing plaintiff is not awarded attorney's fees and
costs, then the plaintiff's remedy is significantly reduced and the public
purpose sought by Congress is not fulfilled.
Some arbitration agreements or arbitration agency rules give the
arbitrator discretion to assess some or all of these costs against the
employer. 92 This is less than half-a-loaf, for most arbitrators are reluctant
denied, No. 00-2839, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21668 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2002) (specifying in
arbitration clause that, "[e]ach party may retain legal counsel and shall pay its own costs and
attorneys' fees, regardless of the outcome of the arbitration.").
84. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1997)
(concerning an age discrimination case where the complainant obtained an arbitration award
of $220,000 in damages and claimed attorney's fees and costs of $249,050.10).
85. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(k), 78 Stat.
241, 261 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000)) (providing that "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee .... ").
86. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 505, 104 Stat. 327,
371 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000)) (providing that "the court, or agency, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee .... ").
87. The Court has made clear that, in spite of the discretionary language, the prevailing
plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17
(1978) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
88. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (2000)) ("The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to
plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action.").
89. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(b), 81
Stat. 602, 604 (1968) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000)) ("[T]he court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter ... ").
90. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 107(a)(3), 107 Stat. 6,
16 (1994) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (2000)) ("The court in such an action shall...
allow a reasonable attorney's fee ... to be paid by the defendant."). Unlike Title VII, the
wording of the FMLA is mandatory.
91. Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 418 (quoting Newman, 390 U.S. at 402).
92. The AAA rules provide, "[a]ll expenses of the arbitration, including required travel
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to exercise such discretion because the employer, on whom the arbitrator's
future business prospects depend, may feel that this is pouring salt into the
wound of an already unfavorable decision. Although the arbitrator may
ultimately assess costs against the employer, the wronged employee has no
advance assurance, and the risk of large expenses will discourage her from
pursuing the enforcement of her rights and from serving as a private
attorney general.
E. Class Actions
Class actions are generally available in the courts for violation of
statutory rights of individual employees,93 whether they are suits for
violation of Title VII,94 the Equal Pay Act,95 FLSA,96 ADEA,97 ADA,98 or
FMLA.99 The availability of class actions significantly increases the ability
and other expenses of the arbitrator, AAA representatives, and any witness and the costs
relating to any proof produced at the direction of the arbitrator, shall be borne by the
employer .... AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at R. 39; see also R. 34(e)
(allowing arbitrator to award reimbursement of representative's fees). However, under the
heading "Administrative Fee Schedule" (following R. 42) and its subheading
"Administrative Fee," for employer-promulgated plans, the Rules provide that, "[ulnless the
employee chooses to pay a portion of the arbitrator's compensation, such compensation
shall be paid in total by the employer." If the employee's choice to pay is the same as her
choice to agree to arbitrate, it becomes the employer's de facto choice made during the
drafting of the arbitration agreement. See also Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167
F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[U]nder NYSE and NASD rules, it is standard practice in
the securities industry for employers to pay all of the arbitrators' fees.").
93. See Jean R. Sterlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 28-37 (2000) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Class Action Survive?] (providing a comprehensive discussion of arbitration and
class actions).
94. See generally Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. REv. 305.
95. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (2000)); see, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451
U.S. 77, 81 (1981) (involving class action by female flight attendants under Equal Pay Act).
96. As a result of amendments to the FLSA contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947, members of the class must now individually file their written consent in court. Pub.
L. No. 80-49, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1948) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000)). Therefore,
a representative action under the FLSA is not a true class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
but rather an "opt in" procedure.
97. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(b), 81
Stat. 602, 604 (1968) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000)) ("The provisions of this
chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided
in section[] ... 216 ... of this title [29] .... ").
98. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 447-58
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing class action certification procedures under ADA using FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)).
99. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 107(a)(2)(B), 107
Stat. 6, 16 (1994) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B) (2000)).
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of individuals to obtain a lawyer who will enforce their rights and, as
attorneys general, to further the public purpose of the statute. Attorneys
will refuse to take many individual discrimination cases where they are less
than certain of winning because the prospective damages are too small to
risk accepting the representation on a contingency fee basis. Reliance on
statutory attorney fees is a gamble because they get nothing if they lose.
Class actions are attractive to the plaintiffs' bar because of the potentially
large damages and the ability to settle uncertain claims-the settlement
including attorney's fees and costs.
Arbitration agreements can provide for class actions, but they seldom
do. More often, these agreements are silent as to the availability of any
form of collective plaintiff procedure and courts generally refuse to imply
such a provision. In Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.,'0 sixty-three manual
laborers who worked on a per diem basis brought suit for violation of the
FLSA because they were not paid for waiting time, travel time, and
training, which would entitle them to overtime.'1 Workers who applied for
Labor Ready's pool were required to sign an application that included a
mandatory arbitration clause silent as to the availability of class actions or
representative suits. Labor Ready, on the basis of this application, moved
to dismiss the suit and sought an order forcing Adkins to arbitrate his
individual claim. 10 Adkins contended that the arbitration costs were so
high, and the amount any individual could recover so small, that no
individual would be willing to gamble on the victory necessary to
reimburse them for their lawyer's fees and costs.' °3
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, hypothesizing that a
successful plaintiff could recover attorney's fees and costs,' °4 blithely
ignoring that this arrangement left the plaintiff at risk of losing and not able
to proceed except in the near-certain case. The Fourth Circuit read the
silence in the arbitration clause as barring a class action or representative
suit and ordered Adkins to arbitrate his individual claim.'05 The decision
thereby precluded him from a collective action either in court or arbitration.
His sole recourse for vindicating his statutory rights, and the public interest,
was an arbitration process that would risk costs far beyond the
underpayment claimed.
This result is contrary to normal rules of contract interpretation for it
effectively deprives the plaintiff of his statutory remedy both in court and
in arbitration-a result certainly not intended by the plaintiff. If such a
100. 303 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2002).
101. Id. at 499.
102. Id. at 499-500.
103. Id. at 502.
104. Id. at 502 n.1.
105. Id. at 503.
2004]
702 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 6:3
deprivation were intended by the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff did
not so intend, this would constitute fraud. 106 Where Congress has allowed
class actions to enforce statutory rights,' °7 and arbitration is agreed upon as
a substitute to enforce those rights, the contract should be interpreted as
allowing class actions in court, unless the arbitration provision explicitly
allowed class-action arbitration. The court might better read an ambiguous
or silent provision as allowing the plaintiff to proceed in either.
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, °' s a plurality of the Supreme
Court expressed the view that a determination as to whether the arbitration
agreement permitted or prohibited collective action was a matter of
interpretation for the arbitrator.' 9  This promises little protection for
victimized employees. As a plaintiffs' lawyer said in a 2003 panel
discussion before the Federalist Society, "[a]n arbitrator who wants to be
chosen again by an employer is going to be reluctant to subject an
employer to large claims."11 It is the employer-customer who must be
satisfied with the lists of arbitrators submitted by the arbitration agencies.
The trend is for employers to expressly exclude class actions in their
mandatory arbitration provisions as a precaution against a court or
arbitrator sensibly interpreting silence."' One employer member of the
Federalist Society panel stated that he counseled employers that the
primary advantage of arbitration is not that it is cheaper, quicker, or less
burdensome than litigation, but rather that it allows employers to avoid
class actions: "[d]espite the potential disadvantages to employers who
require arbitration, the primary question asked by companies considering
arbitration is: 'Can we cut off class and collective actions by requiring
arbitration?'112
106. See, e.g., Lipsit v. Leonard, 315 A.2d 25, 28 (N.J. 1974) (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 109 (4th ed. 1971)).
107. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (allowing FLSA plaintiffs to file action "in
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated."); see also Carter v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., 189 F. Supp. 2d 606, 621 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that
employees' class action suit to recover overtime compensation from their former employers
under the FLSA was subject to binding arbitration under the FAA, but that the fee
arrangement was void), affd, No. 03-10484, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4310 (5th Cir. Mar. 5,
2004).
108. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
109. Id. at 2407 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens would not have reached the question
of who should be the decisionmaker. Id. at 2408 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Class Action Bans in Arbitration Pacts Could Create Limits on Substantive Rights,
72 U.S.L.W. No. 19, at 2294 (Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Class Action Bans] (reporting
comment by Richard T. Seymour, Esq.).
111. See Sternlight, Class Action Survive?, supra note 93, at 90-91; Jacqueline E.
Mottek, Analysis & Perspective, The Impact of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses on Class
Certification, 69 U.S.L.W. No. 20, at 2307 (Nov. 28, 2000).
112. Class Action Bans, supra note 110, at 2294 (reporting comment by Robert P. Davis,
Esq.).
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Courts, by enforcing those exclusionary clauses, permit employers to
deny employees access to class actions which would be available in the
courts. This is in the face of a statute that sought to facilitate limited class
action in order to enable employees to enforce their rights and to encourage
them and their lawyers to serve as private attorneys general." 3 Contrary to
the reassuring words of Gilmer, arbitration requires the employee to "forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute,"'"1 4 and the statute will no
longer "serve both its remedial and deterrent function.""1 5
So long as the availability of class action in arbitration depends on the
terms of the arbitration provisions mandated by the employer, lawyers
representing employers will include provisions which will deprive
employees of the advantages of class actions. As Professor Sternlight
points out in her comprehensive analysis, "[t]he most critical question...
is whether companies do or should have the power to eliminate entirely the
class action remedy .... ,6 In practice, many claims can only be brought
as class action suits; without the class action procedure, individual rights
will go unrealized, wrongful conduct will be undeterred, and the public
interest will go unfulfilled.
F. Public Knowledge and Precedent
Judicial proceedings are open to the public and judges explain, in
published opinions, the reasons for their decisions. Those decisions are
subject to examination and criticism by other judges, lawyers, and scholars.
Arbitration proceedings, on the other hand, are confidential and arbitration
rules and practices, except in grievance arbitration,' 7 do not require a
publicly available opinion explaining the reason for the decision.1 8 They
113. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. § 4(a) (2003);
H.R. REP. No. 108-144, at 35 (2003) (explaining that the act intends to preserve federal
court jurisdiction over "so-called 'private attorney general' suits such as those in which an
individual seeks to recover on behalf of the general public."). This act was passed in the
House by a 253-170 vote on June 12, 2003, and then referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, where it has sat since. Juliet Eilperin, House Backs Bill to Curb Class Action
Suits, WASH. POST, June 13, 2003, at A8.
114. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
115. Id. at 28 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
116. Sternlight, Class Action Survive?, supra note 93, at 79.
117. See, e.g., LABOR ARBITRATION RULES R. 38 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 2002) ("The
award shall be in writing and shall be signed either by the neutral arbitrator or by a
concurring majority if there is more than one arbitrator."), available at http://www.adr.org/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
118. NAF CODE, supra note 23, at R. 37(G) ("An Award shall not include any reasons,
findings of fact or conclusions of law unless required by prior written agreement of the
Parties or requested in writing by a Party before the beginning of any Hearing."). But cf
AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at R. 34(c) (providing that "[t]he award shall be
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are thus shielded from examination and criticism by other arbitrators or
anyone else. Arbitration awards without published opinions are shrouded
law.
This lack of published arbitration opinions has four substantial
consequences. First, the parties are unable to know their rights and duties,
for there are no precedents to guide them; indeed, one of the traditional
rules in arbitration is that there is no stare decisis. Lawyers, therefore,
cannot reliably advise the parties. Second, prospective employees can gain
only limited knowledge of an employer's practices, as contrasted with the
platitudes contained in the employee handbook. Thus, the employer is
shielded from the reputational effects of its actions. One of the reasons that
employers prefer arbitration is because it avoids potentially unfavorable
publicity, thereby limiting consumers,' and others,' ability to know whether
they are patronizing a lawbreaker. Third, and more important, when
statutory rights are at stake, the public needs to know how these statutes
are, in practice, being interpreted and applied. This is essential for the
public to make any sensible political judgments as to whether, and how, the
statute should be amended. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the lack of
opinions stunts the growth of the law. Arbitrators working from the bare
words of a statute cannot build a body of precedent systematically
elaborating the statute. One need only compare the poverty of the bare
words of Title VII with the richness and complexity of the body of law that
now surrounds it, including protection from harassment, responsibility for
supervisors' conduct, shifting burdens of proof, recognition of disparate
impact, and affirmative action remedies. Finally, there is an effective
denial of judicial review in the arbitration forum, which will be discussed
next in Part I(G).
The harm caused by the lack of reasoned opinions is further
aggravated by the rule that arbitration proceedings in their entirety are
confidential unless the parties agree to make them public. " 9 The practical
effectiveness of the statute is hidden in unpublished and opinionless
awards. The public may thus be kept ignorant of what arbitrators are doing
in writing.., and shall provide the written reasons for the award ...."). However, the
names of the parties and witnesses will not be publicly available unless a party expressly
agrees. Id. at R. 34(b).
119. See AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at R. 18 ("The arbitrator shall
maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and shall have the authority to make
appropriate rulings to safeguard that confidentiality, unless the parties agree
otherwise...."); NAF CODE, supra note 23, at R. 4 ("Arbitration proceedings are
confidential, unless all Parties agree otherwise.... A Party who improperly discloses
confidential information shall be subject to Sanctions."); see also DiRussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the arbitration agreement
may include a confidentiality agreement which requires all court files to be sealed except the
court opinions and orders).
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in the name of the statute. Whether justice is being done is kept secret.
This may be tolerable when only the parties' contractual issues are
implicated, but it is intolerable when the stakes involve both an individual's
civil and statutory rights as well as the public interest.
Movement of cases from the courts to the arbitration forum, which
lacks written opinions, precludes creation of the body of precedent
necessary to develop and articulate any generally accepted interpretation of
the statute. The parties cannot know the law that is to guide their conduct
and the public cannot know whether the public purpose is being served. It
is true that not all cases will go to arbitration, thereby allowing the courts to
establish precedents and elaborate the statute. However, with employers'
increasing imposition of predispute arbitration in employment contracts,
court decisions may soon be, if not already, the minority, and the growth of
the law will be stunted or deformed. There may not be any court decision
on the issue in the particular case to guide the arbitrator, who must then
make the law applicable to that case. Even if there are applicable court
decisions, the arbitrator may not be bound by them, as will be developed in
the next section. The arbitrator will focus primarily on the interests of the
parties before him, largely ignoring the public interest. These employment
rights statutes are an expression of the public will for public purposes and
thus the controlling law should be developed and defined by the courts, not
by private arbitration tribunals unguided by others' judgments and unbound
by precedent.
G. Judicial Review
An arbitrator's decision enjoys an invulnerability not conferred on any
judge's ruling, jury verdict, or administrative agency's decision.
12
0
Decisions by trial courts and administrative agencies can be appealed to
appellate courts. Their determinations of fact can be rejected if not
supported by the evidence; 121 a trial judge's application of the law can be
displaced by an appellate court's independent determination; 122 and an
administrative agency's decisions sometimes receive the limited deference
of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.123 Even
jury verdicts can be overruled by the trial judge on question of law.124 In
120. See generally Moore, supra note 32, at 1583-88 (discussing how arbitral decisions
are rarely reviewed by the judiciary).
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) ("The courts of appeals.., shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts .... ).
123. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); see also Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, Pub.
L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243-44 (1947) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000))
(specifying scope of judicial review of administrative agency decisions).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b)
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contrast, section 10 of the FAA limits the grounds for vacating an
arbitrator's award to proven corruption, fraud, partiality, or misconduct by
the arbitrator. 125 It provides no review for the arbitrator's determinations of
fact or application of law.
In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court added a common law ground,
stating that an arbitrator's award could also be vacated for "manifest
disregard" of the law. 2 6 The Court has never defined the meaning of these
words, and the lower courts have never settled on a definition. A common
statement is that the arbitrator: must know of the governing legal principle,
yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether; and the law ignored by the
arbitrator was "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.',
12 7
Obviously, judicial review under "manifest disregard" is extremely
deferential, and even more limited than the review of a grievance
arbitration where the "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement."' 128  In DiRussa, the
arbitrators found a violation of the ADEA, and awarded DiRussa, the
plaintiff, $220,000 in damages, but refused to award him attorney's fees
and costs of $249,050, although they had been requested and were
explicitly required by the statute. 129 DiRussa sued to modify the award and
obtain the statutorily provided attorney fees. The Second Circuit refused to
modify the award; quoting from an earlier opinion, the court defined
"manifest disregard of law" in these terms:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily
and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve
as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the
arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.'3 °
125. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 10, 43 Stat. 883, 885 (1925)
(codified at 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000)).
126. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436 (1953).
127. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Moore, supra note 32, at 1585-88 (discussing definition of "manifest
disregard" of the law standard). Courts may also overturn arbitration decisions on the
grounds that they conflict with "public policy," are "arbitrary and capricious," or
"completely irrational," but "manifest disregard" is the dominant test. Id. at 1585. The
court in Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
proposed a much more searching judicial review. The "standard is sufficiently rigorous to
ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied" the law and "the courts are
empowered to review an arbitrator's award to ensure that its resolution of public law issues
is correct." Id. at 1487.
128. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
129. DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1997).
130. Id. at 821 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933).
706
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Although DiRussa had indicated several times to the court that he was
entitled to attorney's fees under the statute, and had put into evidence the
amount of these fees, along with an argument as to how those fees should
be calculated, the court explained, "there is no persuasive evidence that the
arbitrators actually knew of- and intentionally disregarded- the
mandatory aspect of the ADEA's fee provision."' 3' The court concluded,
"[i]n view of DiRussa's failure to inform the arbitrators" that the statute
mandated attorney's fees, "we are hard-pressed to infer that they
consciously disregarded the ADEA's provisions. Despite Gilmer's
expression of confidence that the parties and the arbitral body conducting a
proceeding will "retain competent, conscientious and impartial
arbitrators,"'' 33 the manifest ignorance of the law and indifference to inquiry
of a "person qualified to serve as an arbitrator"'34 is apparently not enough
to be manifest disregard of law.
The standard is not always so mindlessly applied. 135 Delfina Montes,
a workaholic sales assistant, sued Shearson Lehman for overtime pay under
the FLSA-the employer's defense was that she was an exempt
employee.136 In the arbitration, Shearson's lawyer, in his opening statement
stated that the arbitrators were not required to follow case law precedent
and should instead do what is "fair and just and equitable."'3 7 In his closing
statement, Shearson's lawyer renewed his argument that the arbitration
board "should do what is right and just and equitable," but that "in this case
this law is not right," and asked the arbitrators, "not to follow the FLSA."'
38
The arbitration board apparently accepted the lawyer's argument that it was
not obligated to enforce the employee's statutory rights and found that
Montes was an exempt employee and not entitled to the overtime. 39 The
Eleventh Circuit examined the evidence and found that the entirety of the
evidence did not show that she was an exempt employee. The court then
stated that "in light of the express urging to deliberately disregard the law,
the lack of support in the facts for the ruling and the absence in the
decision, or otherwise in the record, indicating that the arbitrators rejected
131. Id. at 822.
132. Id. at 823.
133. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)).
134. DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933).
135. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999)
(using the phrase "manifest disregard of law," but bypassing the word "disregard" when
stating that, "it is not manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable
law ....").
136. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1458 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
137. Id. at 1459.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1458.
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Shearson's plea to manifestly disregard the law, we REVERSE"'140 and
instructed the lower court to refer the case to another arbitration panel.
Judicial check on arbitrary, willful, or incompetent arbitrators is even
less than the articulated standard, "manifest disregard," might suggest
because the arbitration procedure makes it difficult for a court to penetrate
the basis of the arbitrator's decision. As discussed above, arbitrators are
not required to write opinions stating their findings of fact or explaining the
reasons for their decisions. In commercial and employment cases, they
almost never write opinions, and the arbitration agencies discourage
writing opinions.14 There may be no transcript of the testimony,142 so there
is no reliable way for the court to know what facts were presented to the
arbitrator. All the court has to review is the submission and the award,
illuminated by inconsistent or contradictory testimony as to what transpired
at the hearing. Even with a transcript, if there is no opinion relating the
evidence to the statutory provisions, it is very difficult, if not impossible, in
many cases to determine whether the arbitrators have "manifestly
disregarded" the law. As Justice Douglas said:
An arbitral award can be made without explication of reasons and
without development of a record, so that the arbitrator's
conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely
incorrect yet functionally unreviewable .... The loss of the
proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial
rights. 4
It is generally said that there is no appellate review of facts;' 44 the
absence of a transcript would make review of facts impossible, in any case.
However, even if there is a transcript, but no opinion relating the facts to
the decision, the court may feel the need to scrutinize the facts. In Halligan
v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., the plaintiff-employee claimed that he had been
terminated in violation of the ADEA. 45 There was no dispute as to the
applicable law; the only dispute concerned the factual question of whether
140. Id. at 1464.
141. See, e.g., NAF CODE, supra note 23, at R. 37(G) ("An Award shall not include any
reasons, findings of fact or conclusions of law unless required by prior written agreement of
the Parties .... ").
142. See, e.g., AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at R. 15 (putting burden on
party desiring a transcript to hire the stenographer to record proceedings).
143. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law."); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (prescribing standards of review for factual determinations by
courts).
145. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1998).
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he was terminated because of his age or had voluntarily retired. 14 ' An
arbitrator, after extensive hearings, denied plaintiff's requested relief, but
provided no rationale. The employee appealed, claiming manifest
disregard, but the district court affirmed the award. 147 The Second Circuit
examined the record and found, "Halligan presented overwhelming
evidence that Piper's conduct ... was motivated by age discrimination."'
48
The appeals court determined that "Halligan presented powerful evidence
of his performance" and also "made a very strong showing that he did not
choose the 'option' of quitting but was fired.... In addition, the
circumstantial evidence ... is consistent only with a finding that Halligan
was pushed out of his job."'149 The court vacated the arbitrator's award,
saying: "where a reviewing court is inclined to find that arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence and that an explanation, if
given, would have strained credulity, the absence of explanation may
reinforce the reviewing court's confidence that the arbitrators engaged in
manifested disregard."' 5° The court, in effect, held that it would examine
the facts, and that an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the facts may
constitute "manifest disregard of law.''.
Regardless of how the standard of review is stated or applied, it is
manifest that review of an arbitrator's award is much narrower than that of
a trial court. The private arbitrator's decision on a public, statutory right
has what borders on absolute finality even when the arbitrator is manifestly
ignorant of the well-known terms of the statutes, as the arbitrator
apparently was in DiRussa. 15 It seems incongruous that a decision
determining an individual's public rights by a private tribunal, tailored by
one of the parties and imposed on the other, gets much less scrutiny than
decisions by publicly constituted tribunals judge, jury, or
146. Id. at 199.
147. Id. at 200.
148. Id. at 203.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 204.
151. Cf Neary v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 63 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Conn. 1999). The
arbitration panel granted summary judgment against Neary. The court examined the record
and held that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the standard for summary
judgment.
The record in this case provides overwhelming evidence to support an inference
that Neary was wrongfully terminated .... These facts undeniably raise a
genuine issue of material fact in regard to Prudential's motivation for
terminating Neary ....
... The failure of the arbitration panel to explain its decision in this case also
buttresses this Court's determination.
Id. at 210.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
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administrative agency.
This lack of judicial oversight does not necessarily favor one party
more than the other. It may result in a distortion of the statute in the
particular case, but not distort the statute overall in favor of either the
employer or the employee, for the arbitrator can misinterpret in either
direction. It may, in fact, favor the employer because the employer has
more resources to appeal an unfavorable arbitration and has more interest
in blocking the development of unfavorable precedents. 53 Also, because
the employer controls the method of selection of arbitrators in these
cases, 154 there is a greater possibility that the arbitrator will err on the side
of the employer.
Comparison of these seven differences between court adjudication and
arbitration of individual statutory rights makes plain that arbitration is not
just another forum. Contrary to the Gilmer mantra, the employer, by
requiring employees to agree to arbitrate, compels the employee, in
practical and realistic terms, to "forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute.' ' 155 The guarantee of a completely neutral tribunal is lost, for the
employer's unilateral control of the selection an arbitrator has an inevitable
potential for bias in favor of the employer. The employee loses the
perceived advantages of a jury trial, may be saddled with heavy tribunal
fees, be required to pay the judge, and be deprived attorney's fees and costs
as a prevailing plaintiff. The class action, which may be the only practical
procedure for pursuing small claims, may be barred and appeals from
manifestly erroneous decisions are nearly non-existent. All of these factors
work to the substantial disadvantage of the employee. In addition, the
public purpose of the statute will not be fully served. This scarcely meets
the test required by Gilmer that only "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function.' 56 Professor Grodin has summarized the point well:
But it does seem odd that we as a society should be willing, in the
name of contract, to entrust the implementation of public policy
as important as that embodied in our anti-discrimination laws to a
procedure unilaterally promulgated by the party whose conduct is
sought to be regulated. It seems odder still that we would allow
the regulatee to designate the decision maker, or the method by
153. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 24, at 195 (cataloging advantages of employer
"repeat player").
154. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 28, 36-37.
155. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
156. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637) (alteration in original).
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which that person is chosen ... then, allow that person's decision
to be kept from public view, and in the end accord it a degree of
finality we are not willing to accord the decisions of our
designated public tribunals.' 57
II. ARBITRATION'S ADVANTAGES?
As this catalogue of differences between court proceedings and
arbitration makes apparent, these are not merely differences of form, but of
substance. They significantly affect the substantive rights of the parties
and the ability of the state to achieve its social purposes. The Supreme
Court's dismissal of the substitution of arbitration for court proceedings as
nothing more than a change from "an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum ' is so removed from reality that it cannot explain the Court's
decision. One must ask what unspoken considerations might have moved
the Court to overlook the obvious and thereby undermine the statutory
rights of workers?
A. Overloaded Docket?
One explanation, articulated by Judge Harry Edwards, is the desire to
relieve the federal courts of the burden of these cases. 59 Suits to enforce
statutory rights of individual employees make up nearly ten percent of the
civil cases filed in the federal courts 16 and federal judges, led by the
continuing crusade of Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist,'6 ' have
protested that they are overloaded. Moving these cases to a private forum
would provide substantial docket relief. However, to do this at the expense
of important individual statutory rights is difficult to justify. The onus,
however, cannot be put solely on the judges, assuming that they are, in fact,
overworked; the primary responsibility must be placed on Congress for not
157. Grodin, supra note 26, at 50.
158. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
159. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 293, 306 (1999).
160. The relevant figures are:
Title VII Employment Cases 20,881
FLSA Cases 3,529
Total Cases 268,071
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY-
JUNE 30, 2002 28-30 tbl. C-2 ("U.S. District Courts----Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis
of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2002"), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2002/tables/c02jun02.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
161. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 44 n.208.
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providing a sufficient number of judges. This situation is due, in part, to
the political deadlock that has caused continuing vacancies, 112 but is more a
product of Congress's failure to create more seats for budgetary reasons. It
is an example of the all-too-common practice of declaring statutory rights
but not providing adequate funds to enforce them.
B. Analogy to Grievance and Commercial Arbitration?
A second, and more important, factor in the Court's trend is its
reflexive embrace of arbitration. This "national policy favoring
arbitration' '163 has evolved because of arbitration's success in resolving
grievances under collective agreements and settling disputes in commercial
transactions. Grievance arbitration has proven preferable to litigation or
strikes and has been almost universally accepted;' 64 commercial arbitration
is not as widely accepted, but it has proved useful.165 The Court seems to
have relied on these images of arbitration, blindly assuming arbitration of
grievances and business disputes are the same as arbitration of individual
statutory rights. 66  On the contrary, there are a number of significant
differences. Agreements to arbitrate grievances and business disputes are
bargained contracts, not contracts of adhesion imposed by one party on
another who has little choice and is largely unaware of the consequences.
Grievance arbitration deals only with interpretation and application of the
contract as illumined by industrial practices and the "law of the shop.' 67
Commercial arbitration deals primarily with the interpretation of the
contract and the application of industry custom. In both grievance and
commercial arbitration, the arbitrator is jointly chosen, not selected from a
list provided by one party or by an agency beholden to one party, and is
chosen because of his familiarity with those contracts and customs.
161
Neither grievance nor commercial arbitration historically have served to
determine individual rights under statutes created to serve a public purpose,
nor are such rights decided by arbitrators who may have no specialized
162. Mike Allen, GOP Plan "Marathon" on Judges: Debate to Spotlight Blocked
Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2003, at Al.
163. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
164. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1473-79 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(describing unique features of collective bargaining arbitration that minimize the risk of
unfairness and noting that many commentators have questioned the logic of extending
arbitration beyond collective bargaining).
165. See Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674-97 (1996)
(questioning whether binding commercial arbitration is beneficial).
166. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 12-18 (Part II).
167. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
168. See, e.g., LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 117, at RR. 11-14.
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knowledge of the statute, or not be sympathetic to its goals. 169
C. Simple, Speedy, and Inexpensive?
The appropriateness and usefulness of arbitration depends on the kinds
of disputes being arbitrated, and the arbitration process must be specially
designed for the kinds of disputes it resolves. The Gilmer Court imagined
arbitration to be a simple, speedy, and inexpensive process-virtues
attributed to grievance and commercial arbitration. 7 ° However, the
arbitration proceedings described in LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 7 '
might caution us against overstating the ease with which these virtues
might transfer over to arbitration of individual statutory rights. In this
arbitration involving claims of sex discrimination, the proceedings,
conducted under National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
procedures, lasted five years, involved seventy-four arbitration sessions,
and incurred forum fees totaling $69,800.172 In another NASD sex-
discrimination dispute, Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,'73 the arbitration
proceedings lasted four years, required sixty-two hearings, and resulted in
forum fees of $50,400.174 The district court in Sobol cited an unreported
case which had fifty-six sessions and $82,800 in forum fees. 7  These
examples certainly cannot be described as either speedy or inexpensive.
Not all arbitrations, of course, are so slow and expensive, but the average
cost of tribunal and arbitrator's fees is more than $5,000.176
It must be remembered that these arbitration fees are assessed on top
of litigation costs, such as attorney's and witness fees, that-in
arbitration proceedings-are not significantly smaller than those
experienced in lawsuits. Typical of the fractured logic used to demonstrate
that arbitration is cheaper is a statement found in a NAF promotions
publication: "courts have recognized that arbitration is much less costly
than litigation. For example, fees associated with litigating an employment
case can be expected to cost at least $50,000. By contrast, fees in an
employment arbitration run from a low of only $3,000 to a high of
169. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
170. Edwards, supra note 159, at 306 ("[S]ome courts still subscribe to the fond, but
misguided, view that employment arbitration is invariably quick and cheap. The simple
truth is it just ain't necessarily so.").
171. 246 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
172. Id. at 705.
173. 49 F. Supp. 2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
174. Id. at213.
175. Id. at 224 (citing Wolfe v. Schwab, NYSE Arbitration Docket No. 1993-003197
(Aug. 19, 1994), at http://scan.cch.com/aad/199408/1993-003197.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2004)); see also Alleyne, supra note 14, at 13 n.54 & 33 n.156.
176. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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$14,000.
'"177
In federal district court, there is no tribunal fee except a $150 filing
fee, 178 while in arbitration, the tribunal fees (filing and arbitrator fees) run
from $3,000 to $14,000 in ordinary cases, but $60,000 or $70,000 in
others. 179 In both court and in arbitration, the parties will have attorney's
fees and other litigation costs. Because the nature of the issues and the
potential liability in statutory rights cases will be the same in litigation and
arbitration, the costs will not be significantly different.
There are a number of other factors that raise questions about the
presumed advantages of arbitration. First, choosing an arbitrator and
scheduling hearings can cause substantial delays. The arbitration agency
must send a list of names to the parties, and each must indicate the ones it
deems acceptable. If none are mutually acceptable, another list will be
sent. After two or three rounds, each may be limited in the number of
names that can be stricken, so one or more will remain. This process may
take weeks or even months. In Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group,180 a
California state appeals court stated that, due to Permanente's stalling, in
only one percent of the cases in which defendant was a party was a neutral
arbitrator appointed within sixty days, and on average it took 674 days to
appoint a neutral arbitrator."'
Second, hearing dates must then be scheduled by agreement between
the arbitrators, the parties and their representatives, normally all of whom
are busy lawyers with full schedules. They may have no common open
date for two or three months; in Engalla, the court noted that it took an
average of 863 days to reach a hearing 18- and additional hearings will
certainly bring further delays. The arbitrator, unlike a judge, cannot set a
date for trial and require the parties and their lawyers to appear. The
Engalla case is, of course, extreme, but it points to an additional problem:
arbitration increases the ability of the employer to delay, increase the costs,
and further discourage the employee from pursuing her statutory rights.
Third, and most important in weighing the claimed advantages of
arbitration over litigation, is that claims of discrimination made in court,
177. Arbitration Whitepaper, supra note 52, at 1 (footnotes omitted).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2000).
179. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also
Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that costs
assessed against the employee were $6365); supra text accompanying notes 172, 174.
180. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
181. Id. at 629; Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 551 (4th
Cir. 2001) (twenty months from the filing for arbitration and the issuing of the award);
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1997) (thirty-four months
between the demotion and the arbitration award with seven days of hearings and the
employee's legal fees were nearly $250,000).
182. Engalla, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629.
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unlike claims that go to arbitration, have already been subjected to a
repeated weeding process before reaching trial. Complaints filed by an
employee are subjected to an investigation by the EEOC and, if reasonable
cause is found, an effort may be made by the EEOC to conciliate or
mediate the case. 183 Should the EEOC not find reasonable cause,' 84 the
employee can still sue, but such a finding discourages many from
proceeding. If the suit is brought, the case may be subjected to court-
annexed mediation and arbitration and then settled.8 5 Finally, a substantial
number are decided on summary judgment without a trial. In 2003, EEOC
received nearly 81,300 complaints, 186 but only filed 393 lawsuits; 87 less
than one-half of one percent of complaints filed result in suit being filed by
the EEOC on the complainant's behalf.' 88  Similarly, of the 20,906
employment rights lawsuits terminated in federal district courts in FY2002,
only 839, or four percent, reached the trial stage before concluding.'89
Grievance arbitration within a collective-bargaining context also has an
effective weeding process inherent in its procedures, with the result that
less than one percent of grievances end in arbitration.' 90
Individual arbitration customarily has none of these weeding
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (2000) (allowing that if the EEOC either fails to take up
the complaint, or if it dismisses any charges, that the complainant be notified and that
"within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge .... ").
185. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 48-49 (Part VIII(B)).
186. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1992
Through FY 2003 (2004), at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2004).
187. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY
1992 Through FY 2003 (2004), at http://www.eeoc.gov/statslitigation.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2004).
188. See David M. Kinnecome, Note, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral
Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment
Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REv. 745, 769 (1999) ("[T]he EEOC files suit in less than one
percent of the claims brought before it."); Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination,
Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the Individual
Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 184 n.291 (2000)
(concluding that the EEOC files suits "in only one-half of one percent of all charges filed
with the agency.").
189. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY- JUNE 30, 2002 37-39 tbl. C-4 ("U.S. District Courts--Civil Cases
Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending June
30, 2002"), at http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2002/tables/c04jun02.pdf (last visited Apr.
2, 2004). The subtotals of the three categories of interest are: United States cases (1695),
federal question cases (18,294), and diversity cases (917). Note that EEOC-initiated
litigation does not exhaust the "United States cases" category.
190. Cf. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 525 n.424 (1992) (relating data from
1950s indicating that 4% of grievances filed went to arbitration).
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provisions. Most employers have no effective grievance procedure; once
arbitration is requested, there is no built-in conciliation or mediation
process and there is no summary judgment. 9 ' The parties may, of course,
settle the case before the hearing, or the plaintiff may decide not to
proceed.
In the grievance arbitration context, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) had more than 19,039 issues for arbitration
panels in FY2003, made about 8595 arbitrator appointments, and reported
1922746 awards. That means roughly fourteen percent of the arbitration
proceedings initiated, and 32% of the cases in which an arbitrator was
appointed, went to the award stage. Thus, the fraction of arbitration cases
that go to decision after arbitrators have been appointed (32%) is about
eight times greater than the fraction of employment lawsuits that reach trial
(4%). Statistical evidence as to the fraction of initiated individual
arbitration cases that go to hearing is not available, but the impression of
those involved is that about half of them progress to the hearing stage.
The weeding process also radically affects the comparative time
required by the two processes to resolve the case. In litigation, the
following figures hold with respect to the time required to close a case:193
Median Time Until
Litigation Stage Case Closed
If no court action 6.6 months
Resolved before pretrial 7.4 months
Resolved during or after pretrial 13.4 months
Goes to trial 20.1 months
Because such a large proportion are resolved at early stages of
litigation, the overall median time to resolve the dispute is 8.4 months after
the suit is filed. This evidence indicates that litigation takes much less time
than is required for individual arbitration.
Arbitration proceedings are unquestionably less formal than are court
191. See Malin, supra note 44, at 609 ("Arbitration, on the other hand, eliminates the
motion for summary judgment.").
192. FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 35-38 (2003), available
at http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/annual%20reports/FY2003_Annual-Report.doc (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004). The AAA data shows less screening than the FMCS report. While 14% of
the FMCS cases opened go to a final decision, fully 23% of the AAA employment cases go
to decision. AAA FAIR PLAY, supra note 52, at 26 n.76.
193. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY- JUNE 30, 2002 40 thl. C-5 ("U.S. District Courts- Median Time Intervals
from Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of
Disposition, During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2002"), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judiciary2002/tables/cO5junO2.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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trials. There is no need for elaborate pleadings, no jury to impanel and
instruct, and little quibbling about the admissibility of evidence. But there
is an assumed image of arbitration that, built in part on experiences with
grievance arbitration, unconsciously misleads. This image ignores the
reality that, in arbitration of employees' statutory rights, the legal and
factual issues are the same as they would be in court. Lawyers must
conduct the same factual investigation, do the same legal research, and
prepare the same presentation of fact and law as they would in court. If
they fail to do so, they breach their responsibility to their client,' 94 and may
be guilty of malpractice. 95
The major source of cost and delay in litigation is often the discovery
process. 96 In grievance arbitration, discovery is practically unknown. This
is partly because the parties learn most of the facts and contentions through
the grievance procedure prior to arbitration, and partly because of the kinds
of issues involved. 97 Arbitration of individual statutory rights, however, is
quite different. In a Title VII case, the need for discovery in an arbitration
proceeding, particularly for the employee, is as great as in litigation.'98
Those lawyers handling an arbitration claim will usually have a practice
that includes litigation of similar lawsuits in court; they will, out of habit, if
not necessity, demand the same discovery in arbitration as they would in
court.' 99 Arbitrators, like judges, have discretion to limit discovery and
they are allowed to be more restrictive in granting depositions.200 Most of
them, however, being lawyers or former judges, are not likely to be much
more restrictive than sitting judges. Indeed, they may be less restrictive
because of their concern with receiving a future appointment as an
arbitrator.
It is not clear that taking cases to arbitration is either speedier or less
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003) ("Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1980) ("A
lawyer shall not. .. [h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.").
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975) (finding liability in damages for
ineffective representation).
196. See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 14, at 47 (terming discovery "the most expensive
stage of litigation"); Franklin R. Garfield, Unbundling Legal Services in Mediation:
Reflections of a Family Lawyer, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 76, 78 (2002) (calling discovery "the
single most expensive component of litigation").
197. See Alleyne, supra note 14, at 13-16 (Part II(A)).
198. Joseph D. Garrison, Discovery in Employment Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.-
Dec. 1995, at 15 (noting that employees have special need for discovery in discrimination
cases).
199. See Edwards, supra note 159, at 309 ("Arbitration of statutory claims invariably
tends to produce processes that replicate traditional litigation .... ").
200. See, e.g., AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 23, at R. 7; NAF CODE, supra note
23, at R. 29.
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costly than litigation. Arbitration may, in fact, be more costly to the parties
than litigation because of substantial tribunal fees and arbitrator's fees.2'
The cost for the lawyer's time may be reduced because there is no jury, but
this will be far more than offset by the lack of a weeding process, including
an EEOC investigation, court mediation and arbitration, and summary
judgment. Indeed, it is clear that predispute arbitration as a method of
resolving statutory employment disputes may be more costly than relying
on normal legal procedures because of the lack of weeding processes in
arbitration. 202 The Supreme Court's misguided assumption that arbitration
of employees' statutory rights is speedy, simple, and inexpensive fails to
take into account the special nature of these cases.
III. LIMITATIONS ON MANDATORY ARBITRATION
In Gilmer, the Court's premise that the arbitration of statutory claims
"only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum, ' 20 3 was prefaced by the statement that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute ... ,204 Although stated as a fact, it also carries the negative
inference that if arbitration fails to provide the "substantive rights afforded
by the statute," then it is not an acceptable forum. This is reinforced by the
subsequent often-quoted mantra, "[s]o long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the




The Court indicated that the potentially limiting term, "substantive
rights," was not used in a narrow, technical sense. The Court proceeded to
discuss, but reject, the plaintiff s objections to arbitration: the potential bias
of the arbitrators, limitations on discovery, lax requirement for written
opinions, confidentiality of proceedings, and constraints on collective
proceedings. Although the Court found no invalidating problems in the
NYSE arbitration system, its discussion of these potential problems
201. See generally PUBLIC CnizEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002) (concluding that
arbitration is far more expensive for employees than litigation), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.PDF (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). But cf.
Estreicher & Ballard, supra note 25, at 10, 12 (arguing that arbitration costs for employees
are modest and decreasing).
202. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 159, at 309 n.50 (presenting a survey of leading
litigators where only forty-six percent said arbitration is quick and cost effective, and forty-
one percent of in-house counsel said arbitration saves time and money).
203. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
204. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628) (alteration in original).
205. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (1985)) (alteration in original).
206. Id. at 30-32.
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implicitly recognized that the ADEA protections included procedural
rights, the denial of which would reduce the effectiveness of the intended
statutory remedy.
Following this lead, some federal courts have limited mandatory
arbitration by refusing to compel arbitration when provisions in the
arbitration agreement interfered with the ability of a statute to "serve both
its remedial and deterrent function. 2 °7 For example, in Perez v. Globe
208Airport Security Services, Inc., a sex discrimination case under Title VII,
the mandatory arbitration agreement was interpreted by the court as barring
the arbitrator from awarding attorney's fees and costs to a winning plaintiff
as provided by the statute. The Eleventh Circuit held that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable and refused to compel arbitration,
explaining:
Congress determined that to remedy and effectively deter
discrimination, a party prevailing on a Title VII claim would be
permitted to receive fees and costs. By denying access to a
remedy Congress made available to ensure violations of the
statute are effectively remedied and deterred, the Agreement
eroded the ability of arbitration to serve those purposes as
effectively as litigation.
Similarly, in McCaskill v. SCI Management Corporation,1 a Title
VII suit for sexual harassment, the arbitration agreement required each
party to pay its own costs and attorneys' fee regardless of the outcome of
the arbitration; the employer conceded on appeal that this made the
211agreement unenforceable. Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit,
concurring that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable, pointed out
that,
[A] plaintiff in any civil rights suit acts "not for himself alone but
also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest importance" .... The right to
attorney's fees therefore is integral to the purposes of the statute
and often is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from
violations of Title VII.
212
207. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (1985)).
208. 253 F.3d 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2001), vacated by 294 F.3d. 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
209. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted).
210. 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 00-2839, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21668
(7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2002).
211. Id. at 680.
212. Id. at 684-85 (Rovner, J., concurring) (quoting Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc.,
62 F.3d 863, 873 n.13 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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Mandatory arbitration provisions can be invalidated not only when
they are inconsistent with federal statutes, but also when they are
unconscionable under state contract law. The FAA preempts any state
limitation on the enforceability of arbitration clauses that are applicable
only to employment contracts, but does not preempt state law applicable to
contracts generally.213 Arbitration agreements, therefore, can be limited by
state law on grounds of lack of consideration, lack of mutuality,
214unconscionability, fraud, or duress.
In Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc. ,215 an employee
brought suit in federal district court for sexual harassment under Title VII
216and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The Ninth Circuit
refused to compel arbitration under the mandatory arbitration clause
217because it was unconscionable according to California state law. For a
contract to be unconscionable under California law, as established by the
California Supreme Court, it must be both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.218  The contract in question was procedurally
unconscionable because of "[o]ppression" arising from "an inequality of
bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of
,219meaningful choice." Procedural unconscionability is "where an
arbitration clause is part of a contract of adhesion in which an employee is
presented with an employment contract on a 'take it or leave it' basis. 22°
Substantive unconscionability focuses on specific terms of the agreement
,,221and "whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.
The Ninth Circuit then explained what would shock the California
conscience. The Ninth Circuit found that the arbitration provisions were
"unfairly one-sided and, therefore, substantively unconscionable, ' 222
213. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d. 669, 678-80 (Cal.
2000) (discussing the relationship between the FAA and the California Arbitration Act).
214. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n. 11 (1984); see also Mottek, supra note 111, at 2308-09.
215. 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
216. Id. at 780-81.
217. Id. at 788.
218. Id. at 782-83 (citing Annendariz, 6 P.3d at 690).
219. Id. at 783 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997)).
220. Id. at 783-84 (quoting Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146).
221. Id. at 784 (citation omitted). For a more colorful, but no more illuminating
definition, "an unconscionable contract is one, such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make, on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other .. " Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).
222. Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 785 (citing Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
671, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, S 105424, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 3328 (Cal. May
15, 2002)).
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because they covered practically all claims that an employee was likely to
bring against the employer- tort, contract, federal and state statute-but
excluded from arbitration the claims that the employer was most likely to
bring against the employee-intellectual property violation, unfair
competition, and disclosure of trade secrets.223  Provisions requiring the
employee to share half of some of the tribunal costs were also
unconscionable because the California Supreme Court had held that a
provision requiring an employee to bear "any expense beyond the usual
costs associated with bringing an action in court' 224 was unenforceable.
The discovery provisions were unbalanced but "may afford Ferguson
adequate discovery to vindicate her claims, 225 and alone were not
unconscionable. However, "in the context of an arbitration agreement
which unduly favors Countryside at every turn, we find that their inclusion
reaffirms our belief that the arbitration agreement as a whole is
substantively unconscionable. 226
Similarly, in Alexander v. Anthony International, L.P. ,227 the Third
Circuit, applying the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, found that the
requirement of procedural unconscionability was satisfied because it was a
contract of adhesion, "one which is prepared by the party with excessive
bargaining power who presents it to the other party for signature on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. 228 The contract was substantively unconscionable on
four different grounds: it required claims to be filed within thirty days; it
limited damages to "net pecuniary damages;" it prevented a prevailing
employee from recovering attorney's fees; and, it required the losing party
to pay all of the arbitrator's fees and CoStS.
229
These two limitations on the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
clauses- violation of a federal statute and unconscionability under state
law- are largely overlapping. Indeed, an arbitration provision which
failed to give an employee the full benefit of the federal statute, and
therefore violated federal law, could be considered unconscionable under
state law. This seems to be the result in California. 2' ° But the two grounds
for invalidating an arbitration provision are independent, so that if either
223. Id. at 784-85.
224. Id. at 785 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d. 669,
687 (Cal. 2000)).
225. Id. at 787.
226. Id.
227. 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003).
228. Id. at 265 (quoting Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Charley's Trucking, Inc., 20 V.I.
282, 284 (1984)).
229. Id. at 266-68.
230. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d. 669, 678-79 (Cal.
2000) (discussing the relationship of federal law and state law in enforcing arbitration
agreements).
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ground is applicable, the provision, and potentially the whole arbitration
agreement, is unenforceable. This is the result whether the proceedings are
in federal or state court.
The courts are in disagreement on what provisions are unenforceable
on one or another of these grounds, but a brief summary of the decisions
may give some rough picture of what limitations the courts have placed on
mandatory arbitration.
A. Potential Bias of Tribunal
Obviously the courts will not enforce arbitration before a biased
tribunal. The question is how closely the courts will look to find bias. In
the previously discussed Hooters case, the choice of arbitrators had been
limited to a list created and maintained by the employer, Hooters. 23' The
Fourth Circuit refused to compel arbitration saying, "the selection of an
impartial decision maker would be a surprising result. ' 232 And in Floss, the
panel was constituted by EDSI, an arbitration agency . 33 The Sixth Circuit
found potential bias in the fact that EDSI "has a financial interest in
maintaining its arbitration service contracts with employers. ' '234 However,
as we have seen, the Supreme Court in Gilmer saw no bias in the NYSE
arbitration panel appointed unilaterally by a board of employers. 35
Likewise, arbitration through other arbitration agencies, such as the AAA
or the NAF, has not been questioned, even though their procedure is
essentially the same as EDSI.236
231. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999); see also
McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a Hooters violation
employer's arbitration panels).
232. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 939. In Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local
400, 289 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2002), the court followed Hooters in holding that a provision
allowing the president of the employer, a union, to name the panel was unconscionable even
though the union president obtained the list of arbitrators from the AAA. Murray, 289 F.3d
at 303.
233. Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 313-14 (6th Cir. 2000).
234. Id. at 314.
235. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1991); see also
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the district court's conclusion that the NYSE arbitration procedures were
"dominated by the securities industry," because the district court based this on "a
generalized inquiry" and "no conclusive evidence of bias").
236. Compare Floss, 211 F.3d. at 314 n.7 (discussing EDSI's procedures) with AAA




When mandatory arbitration imposes costs on the employee in
administrative or arbitrator's fees greater than would be imposed in judicial
proceedings, some courts treat this as per se prohibited or
unconscionable.237 In Cole, the D.C. Circuit emphatically rejected the idea
that persons seeking to enforce their rights under a federal statute could be
238required to pay for the services of a judge to hear their cases. The Ninth
Circuit, in Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,239 applying the California
Supreme Court's measure of unconscionability, stated that "when an
employer imposes mandatory arbitration... the arbitration agreement...
cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the
employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the
action in court.,, 240 Even a seventy-five dollar filing fee was a problem for
the court because there was no waiver provision for indigence as there was
241for court filing fees.
Most courts find the arbitration agreement unenforceable only if those
costs are large enough to preclude or discourage a plaintiff from
vindicating her statutory rights, but the measure of how much is too much
varies widely. The Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph rejected the per se position of Judge Edwards but
acknowledged both that large arbitration costs could be prohibitive and that
this could force a plaintiff to forgo seeking enforcement of her statutory
rights.242 However, said the Court, "where, as here, a party seeks to
237. See generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful
Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment
Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REv. 143 (2002) (surveying federal court decisions on cost
shifting).
238. Judge Edwards wrote:
[W]e are unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a
beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay for the services of the
judge aisigned to hear her or his case. Under Gilmer, arbitration is supposed to
be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum. Therefore, it would undermine
Congress's intent to prevent employees who are seeking to vindicate statutory
rights from gaining access to a judicial forum and then require them to pay for
the services of an arbitrator when they would never be required to pay for a
judge in court.
Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
239. 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1169 (2004).
240. Id. at 1177 (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 687 (Cal. 2000)).
241. Id.
242. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000).
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invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the
likelihood of incurring such costs. ' 243 The Court refused to say how
detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be, but said that
Randolph's "stray" and "unsupported statements" as to the average costs of
arbitration "provide[d] no basis on which to ascertain the actual costs and
fees to which she would be subject in arbitration." 24 The Court found that
"neither during discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits
was there any timely showing at all on the point.,
245
The courts of appeals continue to disagree on how to interpret and
apply Randolph. The Fourth Circuit, in Bradford v. Rockwell
Semiconductor Systems, Inc., said that the court should focus, "among
other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and
costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in
court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims. 2 46  The court held that Bradford had "failed to
demonstrate any inability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, much less
prohibitive financial hardship .... Bradford's share of the fees was
$4,470.88;24' before his discharge he earned $115,000 a year plus sales
incentives. 249 The court said that there was no evidence that litigation
would cost him less than arbitration, 21° although in litigation he would have
had only minimal filing fees and no arbitration fees.
In 1999, Diane Blair resigned from Scott Specialty Gases, claiming
that she could no longer tolerate the sexual harassment in her work
211environment. When she sued, the employer moved to dismiss on the
basis of a mandatory-arbitration provision in the employee handbook which
252required her to pay half the arbitrator's fees. Blair submitted an affidavit
stating that she could not afford the costs of arbitration because "her
monthly bills exceed her monthly income by $182 per month and her debt
exceeds her assets by $57,000.,,253 The district court rejected this affidavit
because she did not submit any documents, such as bank statements and
bills, to support it, saying "conclusory, self-serving affidavits are
243. Id. at 92.
244. Id. at 91 n.6.
245. Id. at 92.
246. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 764 (5th Cir. 1999)).
247. Id. at 558.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 558 n.6.
250. Id.
251. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 598 (3d Cir. 2002).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 608.
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insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment., 254 She did not
submit any evidence on the costs of arbitration, arguing that her negative
income and insolvency showed that she could not afford any arbitration
costs, no matter how small. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court,
saying "we need greater proof in order to find Blair's burden satisfied.
2 55
However, the court did not dismiss Blair's suit, but remanded it to give
256
Blair an opportunity to produce the required evidence.
Not all courts of appeals have been so demanding of hard evidence.
The Tenth Circuit declared an arbitration agreement unenforceable with
only an assumption that arbitration would cost between $1,875 and $5,000
and that the plaintiff, a janitor shift manager, "could not afford such a fee,
and it is unlikely other similarly situated employees could either., 257 The
Eleventh Circuit, with no hard evidence of the cost of arbitration or the
employee's ability to pay, stated that "half the hefty cost of an arbitration"
including, in this case, a $2,000 filing fee, was of such "magnitude" that it
served as a "legitimate basis for a conclusion that the clause does not
comport with statutory policy.
258
Determination on a "case-by-case" basis was given a new meaning by
the Sixth Circuit in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,259 where it recast
the test, focusing on the deterring impact of the presence of a cost-sharing
provision on the class of workers involved, not the ability of the particular
employee to pay. The Morrison test asks not only whether an individual
claimant would be precluded from effectively vindicating his rights in the
specific case, but also whether "the potential costs of arbitration are great
enough to deter them and similarly situated individuals from seeking to
vindicate their federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum., 260  A cost-
splitting provision should be held unenforceable whenever it would have a
"chilling effect" of deterring a substantial number of "similarly situated
potential litigants"26' from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights. As
Professor Malin has emphasized, the deterrent impact is double-layered, for
262it includes the cost of challenging the cost-sharing. Invalidating the cost-
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 610.
257. Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir.
1999).
258. Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
259. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003).
260. Id. at 663.
261. Id. The Third Circuit rejected Morrison's deterrence test in Spinetti v. Services
Corporation International, 324 F.3d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 2003), with the elusive logic that "[iut
would compel the impecunious employee to resort to the courts-the only alternative to
arbitration in dispute adjudication."
262. Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agreements
After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIs L.J. 779, 791-95 (2003).
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sharing provision does nothing to discourage an employer from including
such a clause because it will deter others who lack the resources to
challenge it in court. The court in Morrison held the cost-splitting
provision unenforceable, stating that for a terminated managerial employee,
costs equal to three percent of annual salary, or $1,622, "may not appear
prohibitive, but... the potential litigant must continue to pay for housing,
utilities, transportation, food, and the other necessities of life in
contemporary society despite losing her primary, and most likely only,
source of income.,
263
Some courts seem blindly tolerant of arbitration provisions which
heavily burden employees' vindication of their statutory rights. In Adkins
v. Labor Ready, Inc., manual day-laborers brought a collective action for
violation of the FLSA.264 The court ordered the plaintiffs to proceed
individually in arbitration and rejected the argument that "arbitration costs
are so high and the amounts at stake for each individual plaintiff so low
that no plaintiff would be willing to gamble on victory in arbitration. 265
The court's blinkered response was that "Adkins does not, however, argue
that he would pay more in fees than he could receive in damages ' 266 if he
won. This ignores the reality that, for a day-laborer, the possibility of
losing the suit and being assessed thousands of dollars of costs would be an
insuperable bar to the vindication of his statutory rights.
In other cases, courts have dismissed the claim that requiring fee
splitting was not unconscionable on the unproven, and questionable,
assumption that "arbitration is often far more affordable to plaintiffs and
defendants alike than is pursuing a claim in court. 2 67 Likewise, it has been
claimed that "there is no evidence that allowing him to pursue his litigation
in court would cost him any less than the amount of money that he has
already spent in arbitration. The courts blindly ignore the fact that
arbitration imposes thousands of dollars in forum fee costs, particularly
arbitrators' fees, that court litigation does not impose. The screw was
given an added turn in LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. When Ms.
LaPrade sued for gender discrimination, the court ordered arbitration for
which she was then assessed $8,376 in forum fees. 269 The court upheld the
award, stating that Ms. LaPrade had "not met her burden of demonstrating
that the arbitration panel acted in manifest disregard of the law or in
263. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669.
264. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
265. Id. at 502.
266. Id. at 502 n.1.
267. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.
1999).
268. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 558 (4th Cir. 2001).
269. LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 246 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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violation of public policy. 270
A few courts have refused to rule on whether the potential arbitration
costs are too great, instead ordering arbitration and waiting to see what
actual costs the arbitrators finally assess against the employee. 27  This
course has three defects. First, it does not reduce the deterrent effect of the
employee's risk of substantial loss. For this reason it was explicitly
272rejected in Morrison. Second, it confronts an employee with a Catch-
22;273 if he goes forward with the arbitration, this fact then becomes
274evidence that its cost is not prohibitively expensive for him. Third, the
arbitrator's denial of costs can be challenged only for manifest disregard of
law.275
C. Attorney's Fees and Remedies
The courts are in general agreement that mandatory arbitration
provisions cannot limit the remedy provided by the statute. Thus, as
previously illustrated in Perez and McCaskill, where the statute provides
270. Id. at 707 (citation omitted).
271. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 16 ("[I]f unreasonable fees were to be imposed on
a particular employee, the argument... could be presented by the employee to the
reviewing court."); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir.
1999) (citing, with corrected pagination, Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 16).
272. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 662 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The issue
is whether the risk of incurring the potential costs of arbitration is great enough to deter the
plaintiff from bringing her statutory claims.").
273. See id. at 662-63 ("Just as Yossarian could not escape flying combat missions by
claiming that he was crazy... potential litigants cannot escape arbitration by claiming that
the costs are prohibitive .... ").
274. See id. at 662 ("After the plaintiff has arbitrated her claims, reviewing courts will
not likely determine that this risk deterred the plaintiff; after all, the plaintiff has already
arbitrated her claims.").
275. Id. ("[Jiudicial review of arbitration awards is very narrow.... Thus, it is not
altogether clear that judicial review can adequately protect statutory rights in such cases.").
In Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255 (1 lth Cir. 2003), the arbitration agreement
required that the loser pay all costs, including filing fees and reasonable attorney's fees.
The employee sought to avoid arbitration because he feared he might be compelled to pay
the high fees charged by the employer's lawyer. The court rejected his argument saying that
this risk is "simply too 'speculative' to render his agreement to arbitrate unenforceable ....
At this point Plaintiff has not been assessed with any fees, nor is it certain that he ever will
be." Id. at 1260 (citation omitted). The court never mentions Morrison, ignoring the
obvious impact of deterrence, nor does the court discuss the standard of review for the
arbitrator's assessment of costs. Musnick was followed by Summers v. Dillards, Inc., 351
F.3d 1100, 1101 (1 1th Cir. 2003), where the arbitration agreement limited the right of a
winning plaintiff to recover attorney's fees and added that the plaintiff must show that the
burden added would preclude him from effectively vindicating his statutory rights. Accord
Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that "the
arbitrator has the authority to enforce substantive statutory rights, even if those rights are in
conflict with contractual limitations in the agreement .... ).
2004]
728 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 6:3
that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, the
arbitration agreement must, either expressly or impliedly, provide for an
equal recovery. A remedy that "Congress made available to ensure
violations of the statute are effectively remedied and deterred ' 276 was
"integral to the purposes of the statute." 277  Further, "[blecause the
provision prevents her from effectively vindicating her rights in the arbitral
forum by preemptively denying her remedies authorized by Title VII, the
arbitration agreement is unenforceable. 278  Similarly, a clause limiting
damages to "net pecuniary damages,2 79 putting a cap on backpay or front
pay, or restricting compensatory or punitive damages to an amount less
than what is provided for in the statutes may make the arbitration
agreement invalid.28 Likewise, clauses imposing time limits shorter than
281
the period allowed by the statute are unenforceable.
D. Class Actions
Clauses denying the availability of class action suits may invalidate an
arbitration agreement, depending on the court. In Ingle, the arbitration
agreement directed the arbitrator not to consolidate claims of different
employees and generally prohibited the arbitrator from hearing a case as a
class action.2 82 The court pointed out that this was manifestly one-sided
because it operated only to the advantage of the employer and declared that
"because Circuit City's prohibition of class action proceedings in its
arbitral forum is manifestly and shockingly one sided, it is substantively
unconscionable., 283 However, in Adkins, sixty-three day-laborers brought a
collective action for failure to pay overtime and for waiting time. 284 The
court held that they had waived their right to a class action by signing the
mandatory arbitration agreement which did not provide for class or
285collective actions. The court seems to have been blind to the obvious
result that it thereby deprived the employees of any effective remedy for
276. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001),
vacated by 294 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 208-09.
277. McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 684-85 (7th Cir.) (Rovner, J.,
concurring), reh'g denied, No. 00-2839, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21668 (7th Cir. Oct. 11,
2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
278. Id. at 685 (Rovner, J., concurring).
279. Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 260, 271 (1st Cir. 2003).
280. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1112 (2002).
281. Alexander, 341 F.3d at 263, 271; Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165,
1175 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1169 (2004).
282. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175.
283. Id. at 1176 (footnote omitted).
284. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
285. Id. at 503.
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violation of their statutory rights.
E. Severability
When a court finds an unenforceable or unconscionable provision in
an arbitration agreement, a potential question arises as to whether this
makes the whole arbitration agreement unenforceable or whether the
unenforceable provision can be severed and the remainder enforced.286 In
most cases, severability is never discussed and the whole arbitration
agreement is declared unenforceable. Where several objectionable
provisions must be severed, the court may say that this goes "beyond mere
excision to rewriting the contract, which is not the proper role of this
Court''287 or that, "a court may, in its discretion, 'refuse to enforce the
contract as a whole if it is permeated by the unconscionability. But
McCaskill held that denial of attorney's fees, the single right of a winning
plaintiff, was sufficient to make the whole arbitration agreement
unenforceable.289
There are strong reasons, beyond the "general rule that courts should
,290not rewrite contracts," not to sever an unenforceable clause to save an
illegal contract, but rather to hold that any substantial unenforceable
provision makes the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable. In Perez,
the arbitration agreement had an unenforceable fee sharing provision. The
court refused to sever the unenforceable clause, reasoning that:
If an employer could rely on the courts to sever an unlawful
provision and compel the employee to arbitrate, the employer
would have an incentive to include unlawful provisions in its
arbitration agreements. Such provisions could deter an
286. Severance is a matter of discretion for the court. The California Supreme Court has
provided some unhelpful guidance on the subject:
Courts are to look to the various purposes of the contract. If the central purpose
of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be
enforced. If the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and
the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance
or restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate.
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696 (Cal. 2000).
287. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1112 (2002).
288. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Inds., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting a state legislative committee comment).
289. McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 00-
2839, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21668 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2002).
290. Fowler v. Boise Cascade Corp., 948 F.2d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 1991).
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unknowledgeable employee from initiating arbitration, even if
they would ultimately not be enforced.29'
Not surprisingly, the courts are not in agreement on this issue. In
Morrison, the Sixth Circuit held unenforceable various provisions in
arbitration agreement which required cost-splitting, limited backpay to one
year, front pay to two years, and punitive damages to an amount equal to
the total of backpay and front pay, and allowed attorney's fees only at the
discretion of the arbitrator. 292 Relying on a questionable severability clause
in the arbitration agreement and the federal policy of resolving doubts in
favor of arbitration, the court held that these clauses could be severed and
arbitration enforced without them, thereby substantially rewriting the
arbitration agreement to eliminate the objectionable provisions.293 This, of
course, did not deprive the employer of its ill-gotten gain- the in
terrorem effect of these provisions on those deterred from pursuing their
claims-a rather surprising result when the court had explicitly measured
the enforceability of these provisions according to their deterrent effect on
others similarly situated.294
Those who proceed to arbitration-voluntarily or by compulsion of
the court---expecting that the arbitrator will have sufficient discretion to
provide a proper remedy, may be sadly disappointed. In LaPrade, the
employee-plaintiff filed suit claiming sex discrimination along with a
number of other statutory and common law claims, but the district court
compelled arbitration under a mandatory arbitration agreement. 295 The
arbitration panel ordered Kidder Peabody to pay LaPrade $65,000, but
assessed her $8,376 in forum fees.296 After the district court confirmed the
award, which the arbitration panel had not explained, the D.C. Circuit
affirmed, saying that LaPrade "has not met her burden of demonstrating
that the arbitration panel acted in manifest disregard of the law .. ,,297
These judicially imposed limits on mandatory arbitration are
potentially significant, but much less substantial than they appear. The
limitations discussed are enforced only by some, not all or even a majority
of courts. The major providers of arbitration services, the AAA, NAF,
NYSE, and JAMS, have scarcely noticed the potential for institutionalized
bias that is introduced when the arbitration panel is named by arbitration
291. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001),
vacated by 294 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2002).
292. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2003).
293. Id. at 674-75.
294. Id. at 679-80.
295. LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 246 F.3d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
296. Id. at 705.
297. Id. at 707.
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providers who compete for employer clients.29 The denial of class actions,
even when a multitude of small claims are involved, seems to have irritated
few courts. Requiring employee-plaintiffs to pay substantial forum fees in
order to get their statutory claims heard, and to pay arbitrator's fees to get
them decided and enforced, is allowed so long as it is not "prohibitively
,299expensive. '  Only a denial of remedies equivalent to those available
under the statute, including the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney's
fees, are generally held illegal or unconscionable, but such provisions may
be severed, preserving their in terrorem effect.3°°  No courts have
questioned the standard of review over arbitration awards, endorsing
without discussion the inadequate "manifest disregard of law" standard.
Courts have failed to move mandatory arbitration toward becoming, in fact,
just another forum, or in construing and applying the provisions so that "the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, ' 30 1 thereby assuring that "the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.
302
IV. WHAT TO Do?
The cures for this sick body of law, which deprives employees of the
full measure of their statutory rights, are surprisingly simple and obvious,
even if courts will not change their holdings and employers will not change
298. In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st
Cir. 1999), the district court concluded that "dominance of an arbitral system by one side in
the dispute does not comport with any model of arbitral impartiality," but the court of
appeals quibbled with the finding and concluded that there were sufficient safeguards
against bias. A hopeful note was struck in Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222, 232 & nn. 40-42 (3d Cir. 1997), JAMS (formerly Judicial Arbitration &
Mediation Services) refused to accept the case for arbitration because the procedure did not
meet JAMS standard of fairness. The arbitration agreement limited the time in which the
claim must be made and barred all punitive damages. JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 29(b) (2003) ("If an arbitration is based on a clause or
agreement that is required as a condition of employment, the only fee that an employee may
be required to pay is the JAMS Case Management Fee."), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/EmploymentArbitrationRules-2003.PDF (last
visited Feb 25, 2004). But cf. JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration: Minimum
Standards of Procedural Fairness (2003) (containing note at bottom of each page stating,
"[t]hese Minimum Standards do not apply if the agreement to arbitrate was individually
negotiated by the employee and employer and the employee was represented or advised by
counsel during the negotiations."), available a http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/
EmploymentArbitrationMinStd-2003.PDF (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
299. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 764 (5th Cir. 1999).
300. See supra text accompanying note 294.
301. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985))
(alteration in original).
302. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
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their practices. The FAA could be amended to say explicitly what it was
originally intended to say, that it did not apply to contracts of employment,
legislatively overruling Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.3 °3  More
appropriately, the FAA might be amended to render unenforceable
mandatory arbitration provisions in all adhesion contracts, so as to reach
consumer, credit, and service contracts where mandatory arbitration
similarly deprives plaintiffs of their statutory rights. These changes in the
FAA, by their terms, would apply only to predispute arbitration contracts,
and not to agreements to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen.3°4 Where
statutory rights are involved, the statute also needs to be amended to
provide for a standard of review of the arbitrator's decision that is
equivalent to the standard a trial court would receive. Otherwise, there is
no assurance that arbitration will equally protect statutory rights and the
social purposes that they serve. In the words of Cole, "the arbitration of
statutory claims [is] valid only if judicial review ... is sufficiently rigorous
to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory
law."3 05
Even without statutory changes, the institutional providers of
arbitration services could significantly alleviate the problems of mandatory
arbitration by refusing to administer arbitration where costs were imposed
beyond what the employee would face in a court3°6 or where the arbitration
failed to provide all the remedies to which the employee would be entitled
in a court proceeding.3 °7 This would include an equivalent statute of
303. 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). This might be jumping
from "the frying pan, into the fire," for employment arbitrations would then be governed by
state law rather than by federal law. Maltby, Frying Pan, supra note 51, at 313. State
legislatures and state courts might be even less sensitive to individual rights than Congress
or federal courts.
304. This solution is advocated by many and a strong case has been made for it by
Professor Grodin, supra note 26, at 51-53. Maltby argues that would make arbitration
practically unavailable because employers would not agree to arbitration after a dispute
arose except when it would clearly be advantageous to the employer because of the danger
of a large jury verdict, and then the employee would refuse to arbitrate. Maltby, Frying
Pan, supra note 51, at 317-18. The NASD amended their rules as of Jan. 1, 1999, to
provide that "statutory employment-related discrimination claims are arbitrable if the parties
agree to arbitration after the dispute has been raised, but, absent such agreement, arbitration
is not compulsory." Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc. 167 F.3d 361, 363 n.1 (7th Cir.
1999).
305. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
306. Id. at 1484 & n.12.
307. Id. at 1482. Professor Gorman has suggested various standards of review which the
Court might embrace, such as the "public policy" standard of United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43-45 (1987), the "clearly repugnant," standard that the
NLRB gives to arbitration awards, or the Chevron standard of deference given to
interpretation of statutes by administrative agencies. Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer
Decision and Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 671-73.
He apparently would accept a congressional amendment that would enshrine a "error of
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limitations and availability of class actions. Where statutory rights are
involved, a transcript of the hearing should be made and the arbitrator
should be required to write an opinion stating the facts and reasoning on
which the award is based. The arbitration provider's rule might also
specify a standard of review equivalent to that applicable to a decision by
an administrative agency or trial court. Some arbitration providers have
made steps, small steps, in this direction. 3°8
Arbitration providers cannot, of course, avoid the problem of potential
bias when compiling their list of arbitrators because the providers feel they
must continue to satisfy the employers who designate the providers. The
most obvious cure for this would be the use of a public agency-such as
the FMCS---or state mediation agencies to provide panels of arbitrators.
Currently, the FMCS maintains a large panel of arbitrators for grievance
arbitration from which it provides lists to the parties. It could have a
second panel of those to be used in individual employment cases, with
arbitrators being able to be on both panels. With these changes by the
institutional providers, the implication of the Supreme Court-that
arbitration is just another forum-could, without any statutory changes,
become true in almost all respects. The one difference between courts and
arbitration that cannot be matched is the availability of a jury to find facts
and assess damages.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, enamored with arbitration as a method of
relieving court dockets, and entranced with the assumption that arbitration
is cheap, fast, and efficient, has articulated and implemented a national
policy strongly favoring arbitration.' °9  In carrying this policy to an
extreme, the Court has unthinkingly undermined fundamental social
policies articulated by Congress to protect workers' rights. It has thinly
disguised this weakening of protections by insisting that arbitration is just
another forum-a bromide that it must know is not true. The differences
between vindicating rights in arbitration and in the courts are obvious,
multiple, and fundamental, all to the disadvantage of the individual
law" standard that apparently would be the same standard as used by an appellate court
when reviewing a decision of a trial court. Id. at 672-73.
308. Federal appeals courts are divided on the question whether the parties can contract
for a higher standard of review. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the
parties can so contract; the Seventh and Tenth have held that they cannot; and the Eighth has
expressed doubt but said that if they could, the parties intent to have courts apply the
heightened scrutiny must be "clearly and unmistakably" expressed. See Schoch v.
InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788-89 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 158 L. Ed. 2d 81 (2004).
309. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see
Alleyne, supra note 14, at 2-3 n.4.
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employee seeking to enforce his statutory rights. Employers exploit their
court-bestowed advantages by increasingly imposing mandatory arbitration
provisions designed to discourage or defeat employees who would seek to
enforce statutes enacted to ensure their rights and to promote broad social
policies against discrimination, starvation wages, and unfair treatment.
The courts have, with only small and unsure baby steps, limited the
potential abuses of mandatory arbitration. They have failed in their
responsibility to shape the evolving law to make arbitration just another
forum. The actions of private institutions have also fallen far short. After
Gilmer, representatives of the most relevant institutions, including the
American Bar Association, the National Lawyers Association, the AAA,
and the FMCS, agreed upon a Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment
Relationship. 30 The Protocol dealt with only part of one of the issues
discussed here: that an arbitrator should issue an award setting out the
issues and the damages requested. 31' But even here, the Protocol makes no
mention of the more critical elements, such as requiring findings of fact and
legal reasoning to support the award. Perversely, the Protocol endorsed the
use of arbitration providers, with no mention of how they should compile
their panels, and recommended that the parties should share the fees.312
The emptiness of the Protocol may be excused because it was agreed upon
so shortly after Gilmer when there was lack of full awareness of the
problems in store. It is now time, indeed past time, for those private
institutions to rewrite the Protocol, and for the providers of arbitration
services to revise their standards in order to meet, in full measure, the
demonstrated need, until that hoped-for day when Congress amends the
FAA to say what it thought it said 80 years ago.
310. DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chicago, 111.
1995), available at http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/special/protocol.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004).
311. Id. at3.
312. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 29, 39-43 (1998) (discussing what the Protocol provides and
does not provide).
